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Mandatory Tax Penalty Insurance
MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ*
In a mandatory tax penalty insurance regime, taxpayers would be required to find
insurers to certify portions of their tax returns. A certifying insurer would be subject
to a governmental auditing regime insurers of randomly selected filings would pay
an amount equal to the inverse of the selection probability multiplied by the
underpayment, or they would receive money from the government in the case of
overpayment. The insurers function as private auditors with no incentive to
underestimate their customers' tax liability. Such a regime will consume real
resources, ultimately paid by taxpayers, and thus should not be imposed universally.
But this regime might be especially useful in contexts where valuation is inherently
subjective or where inevitable loopholes allow taxpayers to disguise economic
substance. For example, if a wealth tax is too easily evaded by undervaluation of
assets, a mandatory tax penalty insurance requirement for certain high-value assets
could help. With insurers bearing the risk of penalties, inconsistent treatment of
taxpayers hould be less of a concern, and tax law can embrace standards in some
contexts in which rules would be needed with a conventional enforcement approach.
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On October 19, 1968, an innovation in tax collection began on the Golden Gate
Bridge: one-way tolls.1 By charging southbound travelers fifty cents and northbound
travelers nothing, the collectors guaranteed that the average tax on a commuter
unwilling to embark on a long detour would remain at twenty-five cents.2 The benefit
manifested in reduced transaction costs, with commuters facing toll-induced traffic
jams only once per day. In theory, this technique could be extended and applied in
other contexts. A tollbooth might open and close at random intervals, so that only a
twentieth of cars would be required to pay, with the toll set at twenty times the desired
per trip revenue.3 Or a supermarket shopper might be allowed to ring up groceries in
the cart while shopping;4 one in every ten shoppers would be randomly chosen for
audit,5 with the shopper required to pay ten times any shortfall (or entitled to receive
ten times any overpayment).6 Yet we do not use micro-lotteries to avoid transaction
costs, in part, because of context-specific obstacles' but also, in part, for
1. See, e.g., BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: HOw TO USE EVERYDAY
INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 131 (2003); Key Dates in Bridge District
History, GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE HIGHWAY & TRANSP. DIST.,
https://www.goldengate .org/bridge/history-research/moments-events/key-dates/
[https://perma.cc/73Q4-SUU7]; One-Way Span Toll Trial To Start Tonight, SAN RAFAEL
DAILY INDEP. J., Oct. 18, 1968, at 1.
2. See Key Dates in Bridge District History, supra note 1.
3. A patent, now in the public domain, uses toll booths as an example of a more general
means of affecting transactions with a random number generator. "The per unit time costs
would be reduced if only one out of, say, 20 drivers had to pay. . . . [E]ach driver makes a bet
with the toll authority such that: The toll authority can win $20 from each driver, [t]he toll
authority's chance of winning is 1/20." Method of Using a Random Number Supplier for the
Purpose of Reducing Currency Handling, U.S. Patent No. 5,085,435 col. 5 1. 53-58 (filed Nov.
7, 1990) (issued Feb. 4, 1992).
4. A cart might include a simple scanner, with shoppers weighing and stickering their
own bags of produce and granola. Presumably because this would allow too much theft absent
auditing, new self-checkout solutions are far more sophisticated. See Josh Constine, Meet
Caper, the AI Self-Checkout Shopping Cart, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 10, 2019, 10:35 AM),
https://techcmnch.com/2019/01/10/caper-shopping-cart/ [https://perma.cc/K2QC-68V7]
(describing anti-shoplifting technologies). Inventors have developed alternative means of
identifying shoplifters. See, e.g., Theft Detection Method and System, Neth. Patent No.
1042282 (filed Feb. 28, 2017) (issued Sept. 19, 2018) (describing a system that monitors
shoppers' heart rates).
5. A supermarket might use a relatively transparent randomization technology (such as
a lottery ball machine filled 90% with green balls and 10% with red balls) to assure shoppers
and others that the audit is truly random. This would help alleviate the risk that stops might be
based on impermissible criteria. Cf Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization
and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 851-59 (2011) (advocating tamper-proof
randomization approaches such as preapproved checkpoints and reviewing the literature
showing racial bias in car stops).
6. A plausible concern is that shoppers might worry that they will make a mistake and
then be singled out for "cheating." Yet with this system, there would be no reason to cheat.
Assuming that the shopper can pay any fines, a risk-averse shopper has no reason to
underestimate or overestimate. As a result, there would be no reason to infer that a shopper
who did underestimate was trying to cheat.
7. For example, the patent discussing tollbooth randomization notes that "a different type
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psychological reasons, including risk aversion, loss aversion,9 and discomfort with
randomness.1
This Article considers applying a version of the random tollbooth to some areas
of tax enforcement. Its innovation is to consider requiring taxpayers to buy insurance
to cover the potential burden of high penalties so that randomness will not impose
direct costs on taxpayers. Such a mandatory tax penalty insurance requirement
should not be applied universally. The analysis, however, will help identify the tax
contexts in which the case for a requirement seems likely to be strongest. The greater
the challenge of crafting rules that meet the requirements of a particular tax regime
or provision, the stronger the case for mandatory tax penalty insurance. With
insurance insulating taxpayers from the risk of idiosyncratic decision-making, the
drawbacks of vague standards are reduced, and tax regimes that otherwise would be
impossible to implement may become feasible. Mandatory tax penalty insurance is
especially useful for existing or hypothetical taxes imposed on wealthy or corporate
taxpayers who are able to engage in tax avoidance and are well situated to be able to
shop for insurance.
The randomization component of a mandatory tax insurance penalty regime is not
so different from the familiar approach of probabilistic enforcement. Returning to
traffic, it is not practical to impose a small fine every time a car speeds, so police
employ speed traps at somewhat unpredictable times and places, occasionally
of toll plaza must be constructed so that each driver can actually make a bet and can stop if he
or she loses." U.S. Patent No. 5,085,435, supra note 3, at col. 5 1. 64-67. This would not be
necessary if the tollbooth simply opened and closed at random times-for example by using a
standard traffic light-but perhaps that would create concerns that cars would hope to speed
through the light as it transitioned to red. A solution might be to charge nothing for the first
three cars after the light turns red so that the first cars will not hesitate to stop, but cars behind
would have advance notice and no choice but to stop.
8. "An agent is risk-averse if, at any wealth level .... he or she dislikes every lottery
with an expected payoff of zero . . . ." LOUIS EECKHOUDT, CHRISTIAN GOLLIER & HARRIS
SCHLESINGER, Risk Aversion, in ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS UNDER RISK 3, 7
(2005). Even a risk-averse agent, however, might be willing to accept a lottery with an
expected payoff of zero if there is some benefit to doing so, such as a reduction in transaction
costs.
9. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979), for a classic article on loss aversion.
Under this account, subjects given a choice to participate in a lottery where there is some
probability of gain and some probability of loss will place extra psychological weight on the
prospect of loss. But it is not clear that loss aversion necessarily militates against schemes such
as the supermarket's. Indeed, Kahneman and Tversky predict that subjects will be risk-seeking
in losses. Id. at 286-87. That is, once a loss has already occurred, subjects will accept a lottery
that might eliminate that loss. Thus, if a supermarket shopper frames the cost of groceries as
a loss, the shopper might accept a fair lottery that yields some chance of not paying at all. On
the other hand, if the supermarket shopper frames paying the cost of the groceries as the status
quo, loss aversion suggests that the shopper would resist lotteries. In any event, loss aversion
will not affect the tax lotteries suggested in this Article because the lotteries will affect only
insurance companies.
10. See, e.g., Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, "May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor":
Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REv. 1035, 1045-49 (2015) (reviewing studies on the fairness of
random allocation of goods).
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charging speeders large amounts." In tax law, meanwhile, the transaction costs of
the government's assessment of whether a taxpayer complied are especially high."
So, it should not be surprising that random selection plays a role. Explicit random
number generation helps determine which taxpayers are audited.13 We seem
comfortable with randomness when it is used to impose penalties but less so when it
is used to collect fees, perhaps, in part, because random collection of fees seems like
a punishment.
The limits of probabilistic enforcement manifest themselves in tax law. A tax
collection agency can audit only a small percentage of tax returns." With low
enforcement, taxpayers tend to resolve ambiguities in their favor. 15 Some taxpayers
will resolve ambiguities in good faith,16 or even cautiously resolve ambiguities in the
government's favor," but a taxpayer maximizing economic self-interest will take
11. This enforcement scheme has serious drawbacks, including the danger that
enforcement is not truly random. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road
Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REv. 651 (2002)
(documenting racial profiling in police speeding interdiction). If lotteries are randomized, this
is no longer a concern.
12. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONG. 16
(2008), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/semiannual/semiannualmar2008.pdf.
13. In the United States, tax audits under the National Research Program are purely
random and are designed to assess the degree to which taxpayers comply with the tax laws.
See IRM 4.22, National Research Program (Sept. 06, 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-022-001 [https://perma.cc/X8WM-BQFF]. Many other
audits are based on the "Discriminant Function System," which prioritizes examination of
returns whose statistical characteristics indicate a strong chance of underpayment. But returns
are still manually screened, with human judgment creating some randomness in which
taxpayers are audited. See I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-10 (Jan. 2006),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-06-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3VW-85H6].
14. For the 2018 tax year in the United States, 0.5% of returns were audited. I.R.S. Data
Book, 2018 (Publ'n 55-B), at 21 (May 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p55b--
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BZ8-Q3MR]. This is a substantial reduction from 1965, when
4.75% of tax returns were audited. James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax
Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 820 (1998).
15. Business taxpayers, for example, may engage in "strategic noncompliance" by acting
contrary to an interpretation of tax law by the tax authority where the issue has not been
definitively resolved. See Timothy F. Malloy, Disclosure Stories, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 617,
619 (2005). Of course, taxpayers may also engage in such noncompliance by taking the
position that an issue has not been resolved on the basis of a slight ambiguity.
16. One theory suggests that taxpayers are more likely to do so when they believe that
other taxpayers are compliant. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L.
REv. 333, 340 (2001) ("[I]ndividual citizens, according to this model, will be motivated to pay
their taxes or not based on their perception that other citizens are or are not inclined to pay.").
On this theory, aggressive compliance may backfire by convincing citizens that
noncompliance is high See id. But see Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003) (arguing that tax authorities
should still aggressively target groups that have high noncompliance).
17. "Some are afraid of audits, others of penalties; some are constrained by peer
disapproval, others by their own guilty feelings; some follow a duty, others a habit, and there
are even those (like Justice Holmes) who pay their taxes because they like it." Alex
Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 689, 690-91 (2009). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., said, "I like to pay
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aggressive positions.18 In principle, penalties could be sufficiently high to offset the
low probability of their imposition.19 Applying draconian sanctions only on those
unlucky enough to be selected for audit, however, would violate principles of
horizontal equity.20 Civil penalty levels are accordingly sufficiently low2 1 that they
are an incomplete deterrent.22 Similarly, criminal penalties are unlikely so long as a
taxpayer can offer even a tendentious defense of the return's accounting23-for
example an opinion letter issued by an accountant.24 Audits are thus sufficiently rare
and penalties for underpayment are sufficiently low that a taxpayer who has
underpaid will not expect on average to pay the full amount owed.
taxes. With them I buy civilization." Id. n.1 (citing RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR
PROSPERITY 277 (1947)). Taxpayer compliance may vary in part because of different attitudes
about whether tax avoidance and evasion are immoral. See Zo6 Prebble & John Prebble, The
Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 693 (2010) (arguing that they may be
immoral).
18. The puzzle in the literature is not why tax avoidance exists, but why taxpayers pay as
much tax as they do. See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 14, at 821 ("For small amounts of
evasion . . . the expected cost of detection would appear to be extremely low for most
taxpayers. So, we may ask, why are so many households honest, and why don't cheaters cheat
by more?"). A number of countries outside the United States exhibit similar compliance rates,
but noncompliance reaches "extremely high levels in some developing countries." Id. at 822.
19. Ideally, if penalties would be higher, there would be a lower probability that a
taxpayer is caught. Even if sufficiently high penalties are normatively acceptable, however, it
may be difficult to adjust penalty levels based on the probability of detection. See Alex
Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting
Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 569 (2006) (proposing that penalties self-adjust so that the size
of the penalty is inverse to the ratio of the illegitimate subtraction to the legitimate amount
reported on the same line of a return).
20. If penalties are sufficiently draconian, the underlying rule might function as a
"property rule" rather than a "liability rule." See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the Cathedral:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Tax, 99 VA. L. REv. 1169, 1187-92 (2013) (explaining
that property rules work by deterrence whereas liability rules work by requiring
compensation). The tax authority also might sometimes be given a choice between a property
rule (for example, through a punishment of loss of tax status) and a liability rule, though Blair-
Stanek acknowledges that this may generate concerns about horizontal equity. See id. at 1228
& n.342.
21. The Internal Revenue Code allows a penalty of no more than "75 percent of the
portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud." I.R.C. § 6663. Even if the 75%
penalty applied to all underpayments, rather than only fraudulent underpayments, this would
be a sufficient deterrent only if the audit rate were approximately 57% (1 / 1.75).
22. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, On Voluntary Compliance, Voluntary Taxes, and Social
Capital, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 485, 485 (1998) ("Given the probability of audit and the penalties
typically assessed, evasion seems to be a winning proposition .... ").
23. An element of criminal tax liability is willfulness, i.e., that the defendant knew that
his, her, or its actions violated the law. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
24. One of the United States' most aggressive attempts at criminal enforcement of
arguably ambiguous tax laws targeted accountants at KPMG for issuing opinion letters, not
the taxpayers who accepted them. See Patricia B. Hsue, Comment, Lessons from United States
v. Stein: Is the Line Between Criminal and Civil Sanctions for Illegal Tax Shelters a Dot?, 102
Nw. U. L. REv. 903, 925-36 (2008) (arguing that the prosecution was too aggressive); Lynnley
Browning, 3 Convicted in KPMG Tax Shelter Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 17, 2008, at 11
(reporting that the original case against nineteen defendants ended with the convictions of two
accountants and a lawyer, as well as an acquittal).
2020] 109
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
To minimize tax avoidance, the government seeks bright lines-often foregoing
standards for rules even where the heterogeneity of taxpayer circumstances makes
rules difficult to construct.5 The result is tax law that distorts underlying economic
concepts and that taxpayers can exploit by structuring transactions to disguise
economic substance. Some ambiguities inevitably remain. Many taxpayers take
advantage of these by submitting tax returns with numbers on the borderline of
credibility. Although the government can compensate for tax avoidance by imposing
higher tax rates, tax avoidance produces efficiency losses by changing the optimal
structure of tax rules, and it produces unfairness by disparately benefiting less honest
taxpayers.
A previously ignored remedy to underreporting could be applied to specified
classes of taxpayers without arbitrarily punishing a few unfortunates: requiring
purchase of tax penalty insurance, with the insurer subject to a mechanism akin to
our hypothetical supermarket's lottery. Properly implemented, this approach allows
virtually no advantage for the aggressive over the meek, even where a tax provision
is crafted as a standard instead of a rule. In deciding whether to cover a taxpayer,
insurance companies would estimate the tax that would be assessed if an audit
occurred. Then, when a particular taxpayer subject to these requirements were
selected at random, it would be the taxpayer's insurer's responsibility to defend the
tax treatment and to pay any penalties imposed by the government. With insurers
paying assessed penalties, taxpayers randomly selected for audit would not directly
face the possibility of draconian fines. Penalties could thus be much higher, without
any ex post effect on the taxpayer. The simplest approach to calculating fines is the
same as the hypothetical supermarket's: multiply any underpayment by the inverse
of the probability of audit, with the government paying the insurer according to the
same formula in the event of overpayment. With such high-powered incentives, an
insurance company would pay on average the difference between the tax that it
should expect the government to assess and the tax claimed by the taxpayer. Thus, it
cannot profit on average by offering sweetheart certifications of tax compliance.
This approach will not prevent all fraud, such as when a taxpayer hides an asset
even from the insurer, but it helps when a tax provision leaves room for debate.
Suppose, for example, that the government decides to impose a 3% annual tax on the
value of every privately held artwork in excess of $1 million. With conventional tax
enforcement, taxpayers could be expected to hire appraisers who would lowball the
value of their artworks.2 6 Even if an appraiser is subject to fraud liability, there may
be a wide range of defensible valuations.2 7 An appraiser would want to cultivate a
reputation for offering low valuations, at least when valuing for tax purposes.28
25. Tax law also includes safe harbors, which allow taxpayers to avoid the ambiguity of
a standard by adopting rule-like treatment. See Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47
CONN. L. REv. 1385, 1398-428 (2015) (discussing benefits of safe harbors).
26. Under existing tax law, appraisers sometimes have the reverse incentive-to
overvalue artworks donated to charity. Regulations govern the contents of such appraisals and
provide a procedure by which the IRS approves or disapproves of a particular appraisal. See
Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627.
27. For a criticism that appraisal for tax purposes is inherently subjective, see David L.
Keligian, Appraisal Issues Now Require Greater Attention for Tax Planning to Be Effective,
80 J. TAX'N 98 (1994).
28. Appraisers have long been accused of shading their valuations in favor of those who
110 [Vol. 96:105
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Appraisers willing to push closer to the line will find more work. Obtaining any
appraisal will likely at least save the taxpayer from criminal liability.29
With tax penalty insurance, in contrast, a taxpayer could be required to obtain
penalty insurance for each artwork arguably subject to the tax.30 In a competitive
market, an insurer would charge the insured for the expense of its services
(particularly, the cost to the insurance company of its own ex ante appraisal, but also
its legal costs in the event of random selection and other costs, such as marketing)
plus a dollar for every dollar that the insurer believes that the taxpayer has underpaid
its liability. That last amount will be zero if the insurer believes that the taxpayer has
paid the amount that will be assessed on average.31 Insurance companies are capable
of shouldering risks inherent in the uncertainty of valuation. While the insurer could
certify a tax return that it believes represents an underpayment, it will need to charge
the taxpayer more to make up for it, and the government will receive the same
amount on average anyway.
An art tax is a colorful illustration of where tax penalty insurance might be used,
and under current law, given the absence of such a tax,3 2 a seemingly irrelevant one.
The hypothetical, however, highlights both the possibilities and limitations of tax
penalty insurance. First, there has been a resurgence of interest in the possibility of a
wealth tax in the United States,33 and this interest has renewed a debate about how
hire them. See, e.g., George M. Thompson, The Appraiser's Requirements of the Lawyer, J.
ASFMRA, Oct. 1965, at 52, 53 (acknowledging that in eminent domain cases, "[t]o many, a
practicing appraiser is looked upon with the jaundiced eye of suspicion").
29. See supra note 23 (discussing willfulness requirement).
30. For example, the government might require insurance even for artworks with a lower
value, perhaps above $500,000. Insurance should be quite inexpensive for works that are
clearly lower than $1,000,000 in value, but this would prevent taxpayers from avoiding the
regime by claiming unrealistically low values. Alternatively, if the government required only
artworks over $1,000,000 invalue to have penalty insurance, then many marginal works would
not be insured, but taxpayers with works well over $1,000,000 in value would recognize their
potential for criminal liability and thus purchase insurance.
31. Suppose that a governmental appraisal of a particular artwork would be expected on
average to result in a valuation of approximately $2,000,000, corresponding to a $60,000 tax.
It is not practical for the government to conduct appraisals of a large percentage of taxpayer
artwork, but the government might hire independent appraisers for, say, one in every 1000
artworks. Then, if this artwork were selected for appraisal and the taxpayer had claimed a
$1,500,000 valuation, thus initially paying only $45,000 in tax, the insurer would owe the
government on average $15,000,000 if random selection occurs and the multiplier of 1000 is
applied. Thus, on average, the government receives the $60,000 to which it is entitled. If,
instead, the certified value was $2,000,000, the government would receive $60,000 directly.
The government's appraisal might not always be exactly $2,000,000, so in any given case, the
insurer might end up paying money to or receiving money from the government, but these will
cancel out in expectation.
32. Indeed, tax regulations are friendlier to art collectors than to tax collectors. See
Stephanie Dunn, Note, Please Don't Make Me Pay Taxes: How New IRS Law Helps Art
Collectors Avoid Hefty Taxes, 37 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 290 (2017).
33. See, e.g., Issues: Tax on Extreme Wealth, BERNIE SANDERS,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/tax-extreme-wealth/ [https://perma.cc/RX8X-8W8L]
(reporting presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders's wealth tax proposal); Ultra-
Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-
tax [https://perma.cc/VR2W-XWEW] (reporting presidential candidate Sen. Elizabeth
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much revenue a wealth tax might generate.34 Taxpayers subject to a wealth tax can
be expected to engage in various forms of tax avoidance,3 5 especially taxpayers
undervaluing their wealth. Such wealth may come in many forms, including real
property, businesses, and intellectual property,3 6 in addition to tangible property such
as yachts, art, or other luxuries.37 In principle, for the ultrawealthy subject to a
requirement to obtain tax penalty insurance, the obligation could be extended to
multiple specified asset classes where valuation is especially subjective.38 With
mandatory insurance, each taxpayer paying an art tax or tax based on the valuation
of some other asset would need to convince the insurer of its valuation, and the
insurer's incentive would be to require aggressive taxpayers to pay no less overall
than taxpayers who err on the side of honesty. A taxpayer might still hide the Picasso
under the mattress, but at least the mechanism evens the playing field as to assets not
criminally concealed.
Second, in the artwork example, tax penalty insurance is required for a particular
good or particular transaction, rather than for a taxpayer's entire tax liability.
Theoretically, tax penalty insurance could be mandated universally throughout the
tax system, but that would be a radical and unnecessary change in any country with
a functional tax system. Tax penalty insurance is not costless. It is a mechanism by
which the government outsources the auditing task to insurance companies
incentivized to make accurate assessments. Taxpayers will incur a cost in shopping
for insurance and in providing evidence about their tax situations to insurers. Still,
there may be classes of taxpayers for whom and classes of tax liabilities for which
Warren's wealth tax proposal). For recent academic advocacy of wealth taxes, see THOMAS
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014); Stuart
Ford, The Need for a Wealth Inequality Amendment, 122 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (2019); Eric Kades,
Of Piketty and Perpetuities: Dynastic Wealth in the Twenty-First Century (And Beyond), 60
B.C. L. REv. 145, 212 (2019).
34. Compare Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Response to Summers and Sarin, "A
Wealth Tax Presents a Revenue Estimation Puzzle, " GABRIEL ZUCMAN (June 25, 2019),
https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/saez-zucman-responseto-summers-sarin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UQZ5-GFYJ], with Lawrence H. Summers & Natasha Sarin, Opinion, Be
Very Skeptical About How Much Revenue Elizabeth Warren's Wealth Tax Could Generate,
WASH. POST (June 28, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019
/06/28/be-very-skeptical-about-how-much-revenue-elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-could-
generate/ [https://perma.cc/46HU-MM8T]. See also Robert Frank, How Much Would a Wealth
Tax Really Raise? Dueling Economists Reflect New Split in Democratic Party, CNBC (July
10, 2019, 3:28 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/dueling-economists-debate-how-
much-a-wealth-tax-would-raise.html [https://perma.cc/656D-DY42].
35. See Summers & Sarin, supra note 34.
36. Difficulties in the valuation of intellectual property are at the heart of the challenge in
transfer pricing law. See infra Section II.A.
37. U.S. tax law included a luxury tax on goods including boats, aircraft, jewelry, and furs
from 1990 to 1993. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13161(a), 107 Stat. 449 (repealing most of tax in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-438 to -444).
38. Some types of assets, such as real estate, might be subject to a wealth tax without
mandatory tax penalty insurance because means of valuation exist that may be viewed as
sufficiently objective. But see Leslie Kent Beckhart, Note, No Intrinsic Value: The Failure of
Traditional Real Estate Appraisal Methods to Value Income-Producing Property, 66 S. CAL.
L. REv. 2251 (1993) (discussing inadequacy of methods as to certain real estate).
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the cost inherent in tax penalty insurance may be worthwhile. Most wealth tax
proposals, for example, are limited to high net worth taxpayers who have or can hire
accountants and who similarly could procure insurance. The costs of tax penalty
insurance might exceed the benefits in any particular context, but the insurance
regime reduces tax avoidance. This Article's purpose is not to resolve the cost-benefit
calculus but to explore both sides of the ledger in more detail.
Third, artwork valuation, though a niche context, happens to be one for which tax
penalty insurance would be well suited. An insurer need consider only the particular
artwork, without delving into other aspects of the taxpayer's income or its businesses.
Evaluation of particular transactions subject to other tax rules may be more complex
because a transaction may have many components, and an insurance company may
need to develop familiarity with a taxpayer's business to feel confident insuring a
particular taxpayer disclosure. For this reason, taxpayers would likely procure
insurance for many covered items or transactions from the same insurer. Still, the
insurer would be well advised to make separate valuations not only of individual
works but also of individual aspects of particular transactions. For a large transaction,
if a single insurance policy were randomized as a unit, an extraordinary bill could be
due in the event of misestimation. A transaction, however, can generally be broken
down into a number of separate calculations, subject to separate randomization. An
insurer should be able to register any input into a tax calculation separately with the
government.39 The randomization would apply to each separately registered input,
with the penalty or reward depending on how the government's assessment of that
input would affect the overall tax bill. Thus, while tax penalty insurance is most
easily applied to discrete valuation questions, its application can be extended to more
complex valuations or transactions involving many independent judgments.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the quality of art is subjective. The art tax
hypothetical highlights that tax penalty insurance could be especially useful when
the core principle is clear, yet it is difficult or impossible for the government to create
objective rules. Even if mandatory tax penalty insurance is inappropriate for existing
taxes, it might facilitate creation of tax regimes, such as a wealth tax collection
system, where it is especially difficult to instantiate some principles into workable
rules in a world where audits are rare. The principle "every art owner should pay 3%
of the value of the art" is an example of a simple principle easily exploited by
taxpayers. The government could create procedural rules about how to value art,"
but these rules cannot do much more than dictate what variables must be
considered-such as sales by works by the same artist or works in the same time
period or the size and materials in the work. If these rules are insufficiently
constraining, the government may add transaction costs but do little to discipline
aggressive undervaluation. If these rules are overly constraining, relevant
considerations would be ignored, such as whether the style used in a particular work
has come into vogue or whether the work is regarded as one of the better pieces by
its artist.
39. See infra Section I.B (detailing how this would occur).
40. The existing rules for appraisal for estate tax or gift tax purposes require detailed
disclosures about the item and "the specific basis for the valuation" but do not provide
guidance on what might constitute such a basis. Rev. Proc. 96-15, supra note 26, § 8(.01)(6).
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Subjectivity in tax is not limited to art or even to valuation. The tax incarnation
of the rules versus standards distinction41 is generally called the form versus
substance issue.4 That is, tax law often must address whether a particular transaction
that formally seems to fit one statutory definition should in fact be counted as
something else, with rules being treated as standards when taxpayers seem to have
abused them.43 As Jonathan Choi notes, "The substance-over-form doctrine has
frequently been criticized as inconsistently applied."4 4 Tax penalty insurance reduces
the costs of such inconsistency and thus strengthens the case for prioritizing
standards over rules and substance over form. Taxpayers achieve certainty in
structuring transactions by purchasing insurance. Insurers reduce the cost of
uncertainty by pooling risk. At least on the margins, a tax authority should be more
comfortable imposing standard-like tax requirements when penalty insurance is
mandatory. Some tax requirements that would be too standard-like, absent
mandatory tax penalty insurance, might suddenly become plausible. With low
enforcement, taxpayers will tend to be aggressive, and so tax law must be rule-like.
If, however, all tax filings of a certain sort must be approved by independent insurers
functioning as auditors with strong incentives, then tax law can include more
standards, reducing the economic distortions attributable to the over- and
underinclusiveness of rules relative to their purposes.4 5
Tax penalty insurance will be much more individualized than automobile
insurance, bearing more resemblance to corporate auditing requirements than to
existing insurance or tax practice.4 6 Many public companies are required to submit
to audits under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.47 Major stock exchanges also require audits
as a condition of participation.48 Public company executives know that the auditor
must be convinced to certify a company's books.4 9 Likewise, with mandatory audit
41. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (Tony Honord & Joseph Raz eds.,
1991); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985); Cass
R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 953 (1995).
42. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 5 (2000);
Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and "iscodifying" Judicial Anti-Abuse Tax Doctrines, 33 VA.
TAX REv. 579, 595-604 (2014); Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and
Substance-Over-Form Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 699 (2003).
43. The classic case allowing courts to focus on substance rather than form is Helvering
v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In the United
Kingdom, the analogous doctrine is called "fiscal nullity." WT Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Rev.
Comm'rs [1981] 2 WLR 449 (HL) (Eng.).
44. Jonathan H. Choi, The Substantive Canons of Tax Law, 72 STAN. L. REv. 195, 202
(2020).
45. On the over- and underinclusiveness of rules, see SCHAUER, supra note 41, at 31-34.
46. For a history of auditing, see Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?:
Auditing Regulation and Clients' Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 1029, 1034-40 (2005).
47. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745 (requiring
specific assessments from auditor, such as assessment of the audited entity's internal controls).
48. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587 (2005) (noting that "the stock exchanges required
independent audit committees" even before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
49. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure andReform: The Challenge ofFashioning
114 [Vol. 96:105
TAX PENALTY INSURANCE
insurance applying to a particular line of a tax form, taxpayers would realize that
they must convince the insurance company that the number is what the government
would conclude-or, where that is ambiguous, a best estimate thereof. Still, there are
differences. Auditing regulation, critics complain, provides weak incentives for
auditors, who seek to please clients.50 A government could increase policing of
auditors, but it is difficult to gauge how much regulation is optimal. With mandatory
tax penalty insurance, the task is easier because a mathematical formula guarantees
that the insurer will want to estimate as honestly as possible.>
Although this formula is straightforward, there are still design decisions in
implementing a mandatory tax penalty insurance regime for any particular tax
requirement. One decision is whether insurance policies should have large
deductibles. If very high penalties are intolerable in our existing tax audit system,
then very high deductibles should prompt objections for similar reasons. The more
complex question is how to reduce the risk that insurance companies will bear-and
thus the price that taxpayers will pay for insurance. Because underpayments and
refunds will be based on assessments times some multiplier, the overall amount at
risk with respect to any tax filing could be much greater than the amount of tax. The
risks associated with particular policies will generally be nonsystematic, and thus
finance theory suggests that the market will not charge a premium for assuming these
risks.52 There may, however, be a systematic component to some risks, for example
because government auditors might turn out to be harsher than expected. One
approach to reducing insurers' systematic risk-and thus indirectly the costs to
consumers of purchasing the insurance-is to try to achieve the same benefit with
lower multipliers. The government, for example, might provide most of the
insurance, matching the per-unit price provided by the private sector insurers.
Perhaps the most significant question in the design of mandatory tax penalty
insurance is what should happen if the taxpayer commits fraud. The simplest
approach leaves fraud to criminal enforcement, much as insurance fraud is subject to
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 324 (2004) ("[E]ven if shareholders do not care much
during a bubble about the auditor's reputation, it is still possible for an auditor to intervene
effectively and prevent fraud . .. by refusing to certify the issuer's financial statements .... ").
50. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors'Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989,
990 (2003) (characterizing "the basic problem afflicting the accounting industry" as the fact
"that accounting firms work for the companies they audit").
51. This raises the question whether the mandatory tax penalty approach could be
exported to corporate auditing. The problem is that the goal of corporate auditing is not to
calculate an amount owed by a corporation to the government but instead to provide an honest
assessment of a company's current condition. Thus, it is difficult to determine how to calculate
the penalty or reward that a corporate auditor would receive if the audit were randomly
selected for review by the government. Nonetheless, analogous proposals exist. See, e.g.,
Julius Cherny & Joshua Ronen, Financial Statements Insurance Enhances Corporate
Governance in a Sarbanes-Oxley Environment, 1 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 226
(2004); Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Model Financial Statement Insurance Act, 11 CONN.
INS. L.J. 69 (2004).
52. See, e.g., EDWIN J. ELTON, MARTIN J. GRUBER, STEPHEN J. BROWN & WILLIAM N.
GOETZMANN, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 305 (8th ed. 2010)
("[E]ven if an individual asset had agreat deal of unsystematic risk, it would have little impact
on portfolio risk and, therefore, unsystematic risk would not require a higher return.").
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criminal penalties today.5 3 Just as insurers of all types refer fraud cases to
prosecutors,'5 so likely would tax penalty insurers. There is an argument, however,
that the insurer should be allowed to rely on information provided by the insured,
except where the insurer failed to exercise due care or follow up on any red flags.
Whether the insurer should pay fines when defrauded by the insured depends on
one's conception of the insurer's role.55 Is it simply to calculate tax based on
information provided to it? Or is it to pursue further information to ensure that the
taxpayer is not committing fraud? Or most expansively, is the role to guess, based
on available information, what liability the taxpayer would be responsible for if the
taxpayer were investigated more closely? The narrower the insurer's responsibility,
the more dishonest taxpayers can obtain an advantage over others, but the less
unfairness to honest taxpayers who have characteristics that correlate with fraud.
Whether insurance prices are sufficiently low and sufficiently fair may also
depend on government regulation of the insurance market. A traditional approach
would be to use antitrust doctrine. Yet one should not oppose mandatory tax penalty
insurance on the ground that antitrust doctrine may be too weak. Rather, one should
insist that the legislation creating the market include robust antitrust protections. For
example, each insurance company might be limited to some maximum market share
to encourage competition. Such legislation should be easier to enact than legislation
applicable to markets that already exist. Similarly, the government could promote
antidiscrimination either using traditional tools applicable to financial regulation or
with a regime specific to the tax penalty insurance context. Random selection
provides a unique mechanism for testing whether some groups are being charged too
much relative to their assessments, and the law in principle could require insurers to
give refunds based on such tests. Regardless of the antitrust and antidiscrimination
regime, the government can promote competition and fairness by maintaining
information about various insurers.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the mechanics of mandatory tax
penalty insurance. It addresses how contracts should be structured, including whether
there should be limitations on the contract terms that insurers may offer. In addition,
it discusses how insurance policies are registered with the government and
randomized, how random audits should proceed, and how the government should
deal with fraud. Then, Part II addresses the insurance market. It defends the basic
mathematical formula by which insurers might pay penalties or receive refunds, and
it elaborates on tactics that might reduce the risk in the market. It then discusses how
the government can enhance market competition and reduce discrimination. Finally,
Part III offers three applications. These applications are not designed so much as
proposals (for which much further development would be required) but as
53. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.234 (West 2014) (providing an example of a criminal
insurance fraud statute).
54. E.g., Aviva Abramovsky, An Unholy Alliance: Perceptions ofInfluence in Insurance
Fraud Prosecutions and the Need for Real Safeguards, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363,
374 (2008) (worrying about insurer influence on prosecutors in fraud investigations).
55. Analogously, one might debate whether accountants should face liability for their
clients' fraud. See generally Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial
Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1437, 1445-46 (1967) (describing the limited circumstances
in which liability traditionally existed).
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illustrations that highlight the limited circumstances in which a mandatory tax
penalty regime may be most plausible. The applications are transfer pricing by
multinationals, a wealth tax for ultramillionaires, and anti-obesity taxes by food
producers and restaurants. This Part discusses how the government might transition
to the mandatory regime, and it highlights the possibility that mandatory insurance
would facilitate more standards-like tax provisions.
I. MECHANICS
This Part describes in further detail how a tax penalty insurance regime would
work. The core idea is simple: An insured purchases a policy covering a specific
aspect of the insured's tax bill, such as valuation of a particular asset or
characterization of a particular transaction. The insurance agreement constitutes he
insurer's certification with respect to the relevant part of the insured's filing. The
insured then has no further liability to the tax authority. The government applies a
random number generator6 to determine whether to audit. If an audit takes place, the
government assesses the correct tax liability, assuming the remainder of the tax
return is correct. Then, it calculates the difference between this amount and the
amount paid by the taxpayer, and it divides this difference by the audit probability.
If the resulting value is positive, then the insurer must pay this amount to the
government. If the resulting value is negative, then the government pays to the
insurer the absolute value of this amount. Subject to this regime, an insurance
company will recognize that its average payment to (or refund from) the government
will be the amount of underpayment (or overpayment). The insurance company will
insist that the insured pay the amount that the insurance company believes the
government will determine it owes-if not directly to the government then to the
insurer to cover the eventual penalty-plus enough money for the insurer to cover its
costs and earn a profit.
Section L.A considers the insurance contract and what it should cover. Section J.B
discusses how the government should choose randomly among insurance policies.
Section I.C describes how audits and adjudication should function, highlighting that
the market itself performs a role akin to that of precedent. Finally, Section J.D
addresses whether insurers should be fully liable for penalties if taxpayers
fraudulently withhold information from them.
A. Contracts and Coverage
We start by describing the insurance contract itself. Critically, tax penalty
insurance differs from the already extant product known as audit insurance. Some
tax preparation companies in the United States, such as TurboTax, offer audit
insurance.7 If a customer who purchases such insurance is audited, then the tax
preparation company will pay for expenses associated with the audit, particularly the
56. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 10, at 1084 (noting that computers have greatly
facilitated government randomization).
57. What Is Audit Defense?, INTUIT TuRBoTAx, https://ttlc.intuit.com/community/using-




expense of an accountant who will support the taxpayer during communication with
the Internal Revenue Service.58 Sarah Lawsky has argued that the availability of audit
insurance makes it fair for the government to select taxpayers for audit at least
partially at random,59 without itself providing compensation for those unlucky
enough to be selected. Lawsky identifies three types of costs borne by a taxpayer and
potentially compensated by either a government compensation program or audit
insurance: "actual out-of-pocket costs, opportunity costs, and perhaps even
emotional costs."60 Absent from this list is compensation for the fact that a randomly
selected taxpayer, unlike one lucky enough not to be audited, might have to pay taxes
actually owed, plus a penalty for underpayment.61 Perhaps this is because insurers do
not wish to offer such coverage, for fear of adverse selection.62 An insured interested
in buying the strongest form of penalty insurance must have something to hide. An
insurance company might be willing to insure underpayments and penalties only if it
knows just how the taxpayer was underpaying. But determining this would be
expensive, and it might involve the insurer in fraud.
There may be good public policy reasons to exclude such coverage even if
insurance companies could overcome adverse selection.63 Tax enforcement is
already sufficiently rare and penalties are already sufficiently low that a taxpayer
optimizing self-interest will take aggressive positions, but at least risk aversion works
in the government's favor. A risk-averse taxpayer might decline to take an aggressive
position because of the prospect of penalties. What's more, audits may be sufficiently
salient that taxpayers overestimate their probability. 64 Audit insurance that covered
penalties would reduce the deterrent effect of tax audits. Thus, taxpayers who cheat
would pay less than similarly situated taxpayers who do not, regardless of whether
those in the latter group obtain insurance. This horizontal inequity provides an
argument against permitting audit insurance for penalties.
Tax penalty insurance emphatically does cover penalties. Indeed, its very purpose
is to cover what may be very high penalties that would be imposed in the event of
underpayment. Is this problematic on public policy grounds? The public policy case
against allowing insurability stems in part from the fact that penalties are low; they
are sufficiently low that if we allow their risk to be shared through insurance, they
will scarcely bite at all. If the penalties are set at a sufficiently high level that the
58. Id.
59. Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN.
L. REv. 161 (2008).
60. Id. at 206.
61. See generally Richard J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties: A Question of Values,
76 IOWA L. REv. 309 (1991) (describing and critiquing the civil tax penalty regime following
statutory changes in 1989).
62. See generally Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law A Primer, 19
CONN. INs. L.J. 29, 44-61 (2012) (describing the effects of adverse selection on insurance
markets).
63. Cf Avi Perry, Restructuring Insurance Coverage for Drunk Drivers, 4 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REv. 427 (2010) (arguing that insurance companies should have a right of subrogation
against its insured when the insured drove drunk).
64. See Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40




insurance company will insist that the insured pay what it believes the insured owes
the government, then this public policy concern is addressed. An insured taxpayer
has less to fear from an audit once covered by tax penalty insurance. But the taxpayer
must convince the insurer to issue such insurance. (We will return later to the
problem that the taxpayer may deceive the insurer.65) A mandatory tax penalty
insurance regime enlists insurance companies in policing insureds, and it thus
provides an alternative to civil tax penalties in deterring underpayments. This
alternative regime provides a sufficiently high level of penalty that the insurance
company has no incentive to misstate the insured's liability.
This leaves to the side the question whether tax penalty insurance also covers
audit cost. This is a small issue because in the event that a contract is randomly
selected for audit, the insurance company will have strong incentives to defend itself.
Indeed, the very high penalty-reward multiples mean that far more will be at stake
than in an ordinary tax audit for a comparable tax return. If, for example, only one in
1000 of a certain type of certification is selected for audit, then the penalty for
underpayment would be 1000 times the amount. As in other contexts, however, the
insured will need to cooperate with the insurer, and that will impose on the insured's
time. An insured also might need representation, particularly if the audit reveals the
possibility that the insured has committed fraud. Given the complexity of issues
governing parallel civil and criminal proceedings,66 combined with the relatively
high stakes of randomized tax penalty audits, if the insured needs representation,
there is a strong public policy argument for someone to pay for such representation.
This creates an argument for tax penalty insurance to include assistance for the
insured, including any legal costs. Protections might be similar to those provided in
liability insurance policies.67 On the other hand, we do not generally seek to ensure
that potential fraud suspects have representation, and the mandatory tax penalty
system could function without it.
This assessment of whether tax penalty insurance should include various audit
costs raises a broader question: Should tax penalty insurance contracts be
standardized, or might we want to encourage insurance companies to compete in
terms that they offer insureds? In some ways, coverage will necessarily be
standardized. Each insurance policy must include coverage for the penalties that the
insurance companies will pay. But policies could differ in many ways-for example
in what type of cooperation an insured must provide to the insurer, or with respect o
privacy protections offered by the insurer. Whether the government should insist on
a form contract or allow competition along these dimensions is largely beyond the
65. See infra Section I.D.
66. See, e.g., Richard M. Strassberg, Yvonne M. Cristovici & Christina E. Nolan,
Navigating Parallel Proceedings, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 2006, at 9.
67. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, A Liability Insurer's Breach of the Duty to
Defend and the Often Erroneous Consequence of Extracontractual Liability, 122 W. VA. L.
REv. 211 (2019) (describing the duty to defend and remedies for breach).
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scope of this paper. There is a rich literature on the benefits of financial competition,
in insurance68 and beyond,69 as well as concerns about whether insureds are able to
effectively compare different financial products,70 such as insurance contracts.>1
We must, however, focus more on one particular type of policy customization:
whether policies should include deductibles. With ordinary insurance products, the
insurance company will generally pay no benefits until the policyholder has paid at
least some fixed amount.72 The transaction costs of insurance claims are not worth
bearing for small losses, and deductibles reduce moral hazard.73 With fire insurance,
for example, liability for the first dollars of the loss may increase precaution. The
analogy to tax penalty insurance is that insureds will be less concerned about a tax
penalty when the insurer will bear it. Insureds may then be less truthful with the
insurer and the government, hoping to obtain a lower insurance rate and unconcerned
that the insurer will owe more to the government in the event of an audit. But if the
insured is required to pay some of the tax penalty to be assessed in the event of an
audit, then risk-averse taxpayers may be more hesitant to conceal information.
From this perspective, loss sharing by the taxpayer increases social welfare,
encouraging more information revelation to the insurer and the government and
ensuring that tax plus insurance payments align more closely with expected
underlying tax liability. If unregulated, however, deductibles might be quite high,
perhaps too high either from the perspective of what the public might tolerate or from
the perspective of achieving horizontal equity. If the market equilibrium would be
one in which many taxpayers choose to satisfy their obligation to buy tax penalty
insurance by purchasing insurance that would leave paying an enormous deductible
if chosen for audit and found to have underpaid, the concerns that motivate low
penalties in the existing system resurface. This may be even less tolerable if the tax
valuation is relatively subjective. Taxpayers should not have to pay large fines
because of the bad luck of drawing a tax assessor who places an unusually high
valuation on an asset. High deductibles undermine a feature of mandatory tax penalty
insurance-its facilitation of greater use of standards in tax law.
This is only a problem if taxpayers in fact would purchase tax penalty insurance
with very large deductibles, but this is a reasonably likely outcome. Large
68. See Somesh K. Mathur, Insurance Regulation: Some Issues, 26 GENEVA PAPERS ON
RISK & INS. ISSUES & PRAc. 54, 57-58 (2001) (identifying trade-offs between insurance
standardization and competition).
69. See, e.g., Vincent DiLorenzo, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Deregulated Markets, and
Consumer Benefits: A Study of the Financial Services Modernization Experience, 6 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 328-39 (2003) (debating the effect of competition on deposit
services, loans for consumers, loans for businesses, securities brokerage, investment advice,
investment banking services, insurance brokerage, or insurance underwriting).
70. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Product Safety Regulation as a Model for Financial
Services Regulation, 42 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 452 (2008) (proposing that government agency
regulate financial products to eliminate dangerous features and improve ability of consumers
to make informed choices).
71. Insurers are not within the jurisdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
12 U.S.C. § 5517(f).
72. See Avraham, supra note 62, at 71 (discussing deductibles).
73. Id. at 72 ("[A] well-planned co-insurance clause can solve a moral hazard problem in
a way that is beneficial to all.").
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deductibles might emerge as a separating equilibrium, competing with other policies
with modest or no deductibles. Separating equilibria develop in markets of imperfect
information as a means by which "good types" can credibly reveal their types to
market partners.74 In the tax penalty context, taxpayers who are confident that they
have paid adequate tax would have an incentive to take very large deductibles so that
the insurance companies are reassured that those taxpayers are not concealing
information. The "bad types," the taxpayers who are at relatively high risk of an
adverse outcome in an audit if an audit occurred, would then be subject to potentially
ruinous liability.
It is not inevitable that such an equilibrium in fact would develop. If the
probability of enforcement is very low, then the willingness of an insured to accept
a large deductible might not provide all that much information about the likelihood
that the insured has concealed information. This is especially so if even an honest
taxpayer faces potentially high penalties as a result of subjectivity in government
assessments. A separating equilibrium might exist, but the primary difference
between the different pools might be a factor such as risk aversion. A similar
separation can occur in other insurance markets. For example, risk-averse people
may tend to buy health insurance.75 Because risk-averse people also may tend to
engage in healthy behaviors, this can offset adverse selection, with the sick especially
likely to buy health insurance.76
Given the uncertainty about market dynamics, however, there is at least a case for
preventing the sale of policies with very high deductibles. One approach would
simply be to limit the deductible to some set multiple of the assessed underpayment.
A formula consistent with the current U.S. tax limitation on penalties would be to
allow a deductible up to 1.75 times the amount of the underpayment.77 But there is
no reason that the formula should necessarily be the same, even in the United States.
Today, penalties cannot be assessed at all if the taxpayer has a nonfrivolous
justification for its position and fully discloses that position on the taxpayer's
return.78 With tax penalty insurance, in contrast, the insurer should be required to pay
based on the actual underpayment, regardless of whether this represents wrongdoing.
Only with this approach will insurers avoid taking aggressive positions, and thus only
this approach makes it possible for the tax code to become more standards-like.
Because "penalties" will be applied even as to conduct that may not be wrong, the
maximum penalty arguably should be lower. The limit on deductibles must reflect a
trade-off between the goals of ensuring horizontal equity and avoiding the
74. See, e.g., Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, Debt Contracts and Financial
Intermediation with Costly Screening, 31 CAN. J. ECON. 573 (1998) (providing an example of
such a model).
75. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1264 (2004) (discussing "propitious selection").
76. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986) (explaining that with "adverse selection," "low-risk insureds tend to
purchase less coverage, and high-risk insureds tend to purchase more coverage than they
would if prices were more accurate").
77. See I.R.C. § 6663(a) (allowing a penalty "equal to 75 percent of the portion of the
underpayment which is attributable to fraud").
78. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
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arbitrariness of very rare audits, on one hand, and of encouraging insureds to reveal
information to insurers, on the other.
It therefore would be plausible to limit deductibles to $0-in other words, to place
the entire burden of the tax penalty regime on insurers. Some might worry that
insurers would not be willing to enter such a market, just as some worry that absent
regulation no insurers will offer terrorism insurance,79 but this concern is misplaced.
If tax penalty insurance were mandatory for some class of unavoidable taxpayer
transactions, taxpayers would need to buy it, and where there is demand, there will
be supply. When insurance is mandatory, there need be no concern that the insurance
market will unravel, leaving no deductibles.80 If no deductibles are allowed, then the
price of such insurance will reflect in large part the insurer's expectation of the tax
level that would be assessed, accounting for the possibility that the insured may not
have been entirely forthright with the insurer.
The law also might reasonably distinguish between individual taxpayers and
businesses, particularly corporate taxpayers. The business association is itself a legal
fiction, one that slices both assets and liabilities among stakeholders, including
shareholders. If a business or corporation decided to self-insure, and if the business
could demonstrate that it would have sufficient assets to pay any underpayment
assessed, there is no reason for the government to interfere with that decision about
how to allocate risk. Self-insurance is akin to an insurance policy with an infinite
deductible, and if one were to allow such policies, perhaps one should allow policies
with intermediate deductible levels as well. This is not an inevitable conclusion,
however. One might also worry about a separating equilibrium between businesses
and about the consequences when businesses face enormous penalties largely as a
result of chance. Business bankruptcies, after all, have consequences for the
stakeholders in the business, including not only shareholders but also employees.
Just as it is arbitrary for some taxpayers to face a large risk on account of a
randomization, so too would it be arbitrary for some employees to face the prospect
of losing their jobs because a business for which they worked was randomly selected
for an audit. As with individuals, if the separating equilibrium produces a result that
is unacceptable, it may be best to regulate deductibles.
A minor related issue is whether the taxpayer should be entitled to a portion of
any refund for overpayment. If a deductible exists, rendering a taxpayer partially
liable for any underpayment, but the taxpayer receives no portion of any refund, then
insurance companies would be willing to certify tax filings at lower levels than they
otherwise would. As we will discuss further below,81 the reason to include refunds
for overpayments as well as penalties for underpayments is that only such an
approach can induce insurers to certify tax liability at the level equal to their
expectations of assessments, should taxpayers be randomly selected. Insurers will
still certify at the appropriate level so long as refunds are treated symmetrically.
79. See, e.g., Harold Caplan, War and Terrorism Insurance: Plans for Long-Term
International Stability and Affordability, 28 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES & PRAC.
426 (2003).
80. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12
DUKE ENV'T L. & POL'Y F. 293, 312-13 (2002) (explaining that adverse selection is absent
when insurance is required).
81. See infra Section I.C.
122 [Vol. 96:105
TAX PENA LTY INSURA NCE
Whatever level of deductible exists should also function as a "reverse deductible" for
refunds. For example, if the deductible were set at $1000, but it turned out that the
insurer received a refund for overpayment, then the taxpayer would receive the first
$1000 of this refund. This would ensure that the symmetry remains and that the
insurer would still have an incentive to certify at the expected assessment.
B. Registration and Randomization
For the government to choose cases at random for self-assessment, tax filings will
need to be registered. The phrase "tax filings" is not the same as the phrase "tax
returns." Although conceptually it would be possible to apply mandatory tax penalty
insurance to an insured's entire tax liability, more fine-grained application would be
preferable. The registration would need to include a number and a reference
sufficient to clarify just what that number refers to. With our hypothetical art tax, for
example, the natural unit of registration and randomization would be an artwork. A
particular registration therefore might refer to a painting or a sculpture by including
a photograph of the artwork, an identification number provided by an auction house,
a description of the work, or so forth. The only requirement need be that the
description should be sufficient to identify. If a description were ambiguous and
could apply equally to two different works in a taxpayer's collection, then the tax
authority should interpret any ambiguity against the taxpayer by valuing both and
then applying the higher number. Such a rule provides a strong incentive to
distinguish different works. If it were impossible to differentiate two works, a
taxpayer could pay tax on them jointly, and randomization would result in a joint
valuation.
Not all the potential applications of mandatory tax penalty insurance, however,
will involve an insurable interest that corresponds neatly to an object in the world.
Another possibility is that insurance might cover a particular transaction. This is
straightforward as well where a particular type of transaction is subject to a tax. The
taxpayer simply needs to identify the transaction clearly. Yet another situation occurs
where a taxpayer obtains insurance for a particular line of a return. The taxpayer
would then register that line of the return. Changing any line on a return produces
some effect on the taxpayer's total tax liability according to a formula. Thus, if the
assessor disagrees with the number on that line, it can determine the amount of
overpayment or underpayment. A slightly more complicated registration might
involve a number that is part of a calculation that produces a number on the return.
If that number is part of an officially approved worksheet,8 2 then the taxpayer can
simply describe the worksheet and the line on the worksheet.
A taxpayer also might be able to produce custom worksheets. For example, if a
tax applied to an art collection as a whole, the taxpayer might determine the value of
the collection by summing the value of each item in the collection. In some contexts,
however, the taxpayer might produce a calculation that the tax authority rejects as an
improper way of computing a line on the tax form. There is a simple solution to this






problem. A taxpayer could also be required to register a "wildcard" for each custom
worksheet, corresponding to the amount by which the tax form entry should be
greater than or less than the amount in the formula. If the wildcard were randomly
selected for scrutiny, then the assessor would determine whether the calculation was
appropriate. If so, no penalty or refund would be assessed, regardless of the
correctness of the components of the calculation. If not, then the assessor would need
to determine the appropriate number to enter on the tax form, assuming that all of the
information reflected in the custom worksheet were true, and the difference between
this value and the value actually submitted would represent the miscalculation of the
relevant line. This in turn could be used to calculate overpayment or underpayment.
The wildcard method could also be used when there is a risk not simply of a
miscalculated line but also that the taxpayer is filling out the wrong form.
In effect, this system allows an individual taxpayer, as well as the taxpayer's
insurer, to have randomization applied at a relatively fine-grained level to a particular
number. This reduces the risk that an insurer faces in connection with any particular
taxpayer's return. Automobile insurers face a lower cost of spreading risk than
hurricane insurers, because a single hurricane may trigger many claims at the same
time. 83 Similarly, there may be correlation across many submissions by a single
taxpayer, and if the taxpayer is found to have systematically understated tax liability
in many different ways subject to mandatory tax penalty insurance, then joint
randomization could produce a relatively large liability. On the other hand, it is also
possible that randomization at such a fine-grained level would be inefficient. There
may be efficiencies for an insurer in defending many related aspects of a single return
together, and a large insurer should easily be able to bear the risk associated with a
typical individual taxpayer. As a result, an insurer should be permitted to link many
separate submissions, so that the government will either assess all of them or none
of them.
A taxpayer's registration of individual filings subject to mandatory tax penalty
insurance is related to but could be independent of the taxpayer's obligation to file
tax returns. A filing, as noted above, might refer to a specific line on the taxpayer's
tax returns or on a worksheet connected with a return. Tax returns, meanwhile, might
well include a form in which the taxpayer identifies all filings subject to mandatory
tax penalty insurance. But this is not essential; a taxpayer might be permitted to
register applicable filings separately. What is essential is that the tax authority
provide notice to each taxpayer that failing to obtain tax penalty insurance where it
is mandatory is a violation of the law, much as failure to file a return is a violation of
the law.84 A tax return would be a natural place for the taxpayer to attest that it has
obtained any such mandatory insurance. An important task for the tax authority will
then be to investigate and prosecute taxpayers who ignore their obligations to obtain
such insurance. Meanwhile, just as taxpayers can enter into payment plans when
illiquidity prevents them from meeting tax obligations,85 the tax authority might offer
83. Cf Howard Kunreuther, The Role of Insurance in Managing Extreme Events:
Implications for Terrorism Coverage, 37 Bus. ECON. 6, 9 (2002) (discussing correlated risk).
84. I.R.C. § 6651.
85. See Additional Information on Payment Plans, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/payments/payment-plans-installment-agreements
[https://perma.cc/UFC2-GPS3] (last updated Sept. 23, 2020).
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programs allowing extra time at some penalty for taxpayers who declare filings
subject to mandatory tax penalty insurance but do not obtain it.
One potential concern about mandatory tax penalty insurance is that it might
reduce taxpayer privacy. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is subject to rules
providing a high level of taxpayer privacy protection.86 Moreover, there does not
seem to be any way around the fact that if a particular filing is randomized for
assessment, government employees will need to be involved in assessing the facts
underlying the filing. Nor is there a way around the fact that the insurer will need to
be provided the relevant information; mandatory tax penalty insurance inherently
involves greater intrusion into taxpayers' affairs than a conventional auditing system.
Nonetheless, if it is desirable to withhold more information from the tax authority,
that could be achieved easily. A taxpayer might submit a description that provides a
means of obtaining the full description of what has been randomized-for example,
an indication that the description of the applicable tax filing is held by a trusted third
party under a certain ID. 87
The randomization itself should be relatively straightforward. If all registrations
are held in a computer database, the government could run a random number
generator for each filing to determine whether it should be audited. Alternatively, the
government could provide each filing an ID number in advance and then perform a
single pseudorandom number generation. For example, if one of every hundred
filings is to be assessed at random, then the government might choose a number from
zero to nine auditing every filing whose last two digits equal the randomly selected
number. The principal advantage of this approach is that it is more transparent.88
There might still be some risk that a corrupt government official could hack the
pseudorandom number generator, but the fact that just one number will be generated
allows more scrutiny. For example, the government might conduct he randomization
publicly using balls, as in cash lotteries or the Vietnam War draft lottery.89 There
may be still more elaborate ways of ensuring randomness-for example by using a
quantum random number generator90 or a blockchain randomization method.91 My
86. See generally Michael Hatfield, Privacy in Taxation, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 579
(2017). Outsourcing tax collection functions presents similar privacy concerns. See Christina
N. Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization: Privacy in the Context of Tax Collection, 47 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REv. 627 (1997).
87. See Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REv. 145 (2012)
(describing potential functions of information escrow services).
88. A secondary advantage is that it would make it straightforward for insurers to decide
either to link various filings (so that either all or none will be selected for adjudication) or
delink them (so that if one is selected, others will not be). Given the above example, an insurer
could be permitted to pick the last two digits of each ID requested.
89. The draft lottery, however, was criticized for being insufficiently random, to the
advantage of people born in November and December. See Norton Starr, Nonrandom Risk:
The 1970 Draft Lottery, 5 J. STAT. ED. (1997), http://jse.amstat.org/v5n2/datasets.starr.html
[https://perma.cc/V75U-4C6J].
90. See, e.g., Quantum Random Numbers, ANU QRNG, https://qrng.anu.edu.au/
[https://perma.cc/WYX9-KUHW] (generating random numbers "by measuring the quantum
fluctuations of the vacuum").
91. See GINAR, A Review of Random Number Generators (RNG) on Blockchain,




point is not to argue that these methods should be used but that any concerns that it
would be impossible to make random selections in a sufficiently incorruptible way
are likely mistaken.
One important question regarding randomization is whether the randomization
probability should be the same for each taxpayer. In the current tax system, some tax
returns have a higher probability of being audited than others.92 With mandatory tax
penalty insurance, it becomes far less important for the tax authority to adjust the
probability of an audit based on the information found in the return. The insurer will
expect to pay any expected shortfall regardless of the audit probability. Still, it might
make more sense for the tax authority to focus on tax returns where there is more
likely to be potential for disagreement-for example because the applicable tax
provisions are complicated or subject to interpretation. Audit probabilities may vary,
so long as the penalty-refund multiplier is adjusted accordingly. This is so even if the
audit probability is adjusted based on information to which the insurer would not
have access. If, for example, the tax authority decides to audit a taxpayer based solely
on a secret tip, then the probability of audit climbs to one and the multiplier should
fall to one.
C. Audit and Adjudication
When an audit does occur with mandatory penalty insurance, what should it look
like? In many ways, it should look much like a conventional tax audit but narrowed
to the specific tax filing or filings randomized for selection. The taxpayer would need
to produce documents supporting the relevant filings. A governmental auditor would
then examine the filings and determine what the correct filing would have been.
There may be cases, however, where an auditor might need to obtain additional
information. Just as in traditional tax audits,93 an auditor might need to examine a
wide range of documents. Meanwhile, an auditor might enlist the help of specialists,
such as computer experts, economists, or technical advisors.94
The most salient differences from standard audits would arise when mandatory
tax penalty insurance applies to a relatively subjective tax rule. We have suggested
that with the art tax hypothetical, mandatory tax penalty insurance can force
taxpayers to pay based on a realistic valuation of a work rather than simply the
valuation one can obtain from the appraiser most willing to discount the work. But
this will only work if the government assessments amount to a new appraisal rather
than a cursory look at documents confirming only that some qualified appraiser has
made an assessment at a particular value. More generally, if the goal of a mandatory
tax penalty insurance scheme is to force insureds to respond to a standard-like tax
provision without being aggressive, the audit cannot be deferential. The more
92. See supra note 13.
93. See IRS Audits: Records We Might Request, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/audits-records-request
[https://perma.cc/KTR4-E63W] (listing types of records that may be requested).
94. Former Coordinated Examination Program (CEP), FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2D ¶ T-
1096 (discussing the composition of teams under the Coordinated Examination Program,
which has now been replaced by the Coordinated Industry Case program and then in turn by
the Large Corporate Compliance program).
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deferential the audit, the more insurers will permit an insured to interpret an
ambiguous tax provision in their own favor.
To assess further when deference is appropriate, consider why some kid-glove
treatment might be appropriate in our existing auditing system. We have already
explained that concerns about horizontal equity explain why we do not force
taxpayers to internalize fully the cost of their underassessments.95 Leniency,
however, can manifest itself not just in the ultimate penalty but also in the procedure
and the level of deference. It may be efficient in the existing auditing system for
some of the leniency to manifest in procedure and deference because that saves
resources. If the auditor will generally give a pass to taxpayers who can generate a
plausible but strained argument in defense of their categorizations, then when the
auditor rules against the taxpayer, it will probably have a strong case that can survive
appeal. Of course, the expectation of some degree of deference will inspire even more
aggressiveness, so we should still expect many audits to impose penalties.
Concern about the resources inherent in an audit will be less powerful with
mandatory tax penalty insurance. The penalty formula means that one can always
audit less often and charge higher penalties, without changing the insurers' incentives
to predict what the audit value will be. With conventional auditing, policymakers
past a certain point should hesitate to accept the trade-off of rarer audits with higher
penalties, because of the concern about horizontal inequities in selecting taxpayers
for audits. We will see that trade-offs remain in determining audit frequency,96 to the
extent that even insurers specializing in spreading risk may bear some cost if the
amount of risk they bear is extreme. But with an insurer rather than the taxpayer
ultimately at risk, concern for fairness is largely eliminated, and so one should expect
fewer audits with higher penalties in the mandatory tax penalty insurance regime.
With the cost per audit less of a concern, audits can involve more intensive review
and less deference than they would in a conventional tax system. For any given
available governmental auditing resources, mandatory tax penalty insurance should
lead to fewer but more rigorous and more subjective audits than one would have in
the existing tax system.
The benefit produced from this approach is that the tax paid by taxpayers will be
less affected by individual taxpayers' willingness to push legal limits. With
mandatory tax penalty insurance, insurer behavior matters more than taxpayer risk
aversion in determining how aggressive a position taxpayer may take. Taxpayers,
however, still matter, because taxpayers vary in their willingness to risk criminal
sanctions. But if audits are entirely nondeferential, the equilibrium will be one in
which insurers do not allow taxpayer aggressiveness, regardless of taxpayer tastes.
Thus, nondeferential audits will improve horizontal equity. In the art tax context, for
example, this reasoning suggests that the government should undertake an entirely
new audit. Because resources still matter, one might still make a case for a slight
degree of deference, but much less than in our existing tax system.
This argument highlights that mandatory tax penalty insurance facilitates the
administration of tax provisions that focus on substance rather than solely those that
focus on form. Analysis of substance involves greater subjectivity than analysis of
95. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
96. See infra Section II.A.
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form, but with reduced deference and with insurers eliminating uncertainty for
individual taxpayers, subjectivity is far less costly. The reduced cost of subjectivity
has implications at two different stages of the tax process. First, it may change the
drafting of tax statutes and tax regulations, at least at the margin. In situations in
which a tax code writer would worry that a tax provision might leave too much room
for argument and be too prone to abuse, under our existing tax system, the code writer
is likely to craft a rule, even if it is much more complex to do so and leaves the tax
authority and tax lawyers in a never-ending game in which lawyers find loopholes
and the authority patches them.97 Mandatory tax penalty insurance may allow the
code writer to leave some subjective standards. Second, whatever the tax provisions,
auditors should be more willing to interpret them in a standard-like rather than in a
rule-like way with mandatory tax penalty insurance. For example, they might be
more willing to conclude that a taxpayer's treatment violates the spirit of a tax rule.98
The same can be said for tax courts, in cases in which taxpayers seek judicial
review of assessments. If auditors should be more open to standards, then so too
should tax courts. Whatever approach the courts take will determine what auditors
will do, assuming that reversal counts as negative in auditors' utility function.99 Just
as one should expect an audit to be more careful, so too should one expect judicial
proceedings to be more in depth with mandatory tax penalty insurance. This
expectation follows in part from lack of deference to the taxpayer's accounting.
Indeed, if one wants to encourage auditors not to be too idiosyncratic, one might
insist also that courts should not be too deferential to the auditors. Judicial review by
tax courts on legal issues should thus likely be de novo. Although substantial
evidence review0 0 can function harmoniously with mandatory tax penalty insurance,
arguably courts should be relatively undeferential even on factual questions or on
mixed questions in such a regime. Although reduced deference increases the risk that
courts will be idiosyncratic, this unpredictability may be more tolerable when this
affects insurance companies rather than individuals.
The ultimately regulated parties, in this case the taxpayers, are insulated from
random variations in judicial decision-making attributable to factors such as
ideology 01 and breakfast consumed. 102 The expectation of what judges will do on
97. See Heather M. Field, A Taxonomy for Tax Loopholes, 55 Hous. L. REv. 545, 581-83
(2018) (noting that tax agencies may inadvertently leave tax loopholes and then fail to close
the loopholes effectively).
98. See Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in
the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1151, 1187 (2010) (discussing "conduct that honors
the literal terms of a law but violates what the law is trying to achieve").
99. Cf Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 S. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 14-15 (1993) (noting that judges seek to avoid
being reversed).
100. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
101. See generally Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case
of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251 (1997) (documenting
evidence that judges' decisions are influenced by their ideological attitudes).
102. See Kurt Kleiner, Lunchtime Leniency: Judges' Rulings Are Harsher When They Are
Hungrier, SCI. Am. (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lunchtime-




average guides insurers who can withstand such randomness. Insurers can change
their pricing and certification decisions over time based on their analysis of judicial
philosophy and actions. Insurance pricing itself will thus fulfill a role akin to that of
the common law, indirectly communicating information about both existing
precedents and expectations of judicial decisions in the absence of precedent. This is
not a novel function of insurance. For example, insurers of police departments assess
individual departments' liability risk, effectively providing a form of regulation
unbound to a system of formal rules.0 3
The general argument that that mandatory tax penalty insurance facilitates
standard-like tax codes also suggests that, in randomly selected cases, creating
guidance for future taxpayers should be relatively less important to judges. With
insurance prices serving a role akin to precedent, the case for formal precedent may
decrease. On the standard economic account, a benefit of stare decisis is that it
reduces adjudicative costs.10 4 When only a fixed proportion of cases will be heard,
and especially when that proportion can easily be reduced by increasing the
multiplier, clearer precedent will have little, if any, effect on legal costs, so the
benefits of precedent are reduced. Meanwhile, a cost of stare decisis is that it may
entrench bad decisions.105 That cost remains just as concerning with mandatory tax
penalty insurance. Thus, the optimal degree of precedential constraint is less in such
a regime. Because what taxpayers care about is how much they pay for insurance,
and these amounts depend on the insurers' beliefs about judges' beliefs about the
best way to resolve legal and factual questions, there is less reason to settle on a
definitive resolution to contested questions. The judge's primary function should be
to consider all available arguments in calculating tax due, so that future insurers will
have incentive to consider subtle differences among taxpayers.
Just as there might be less reason for a judge to create a new precedent, past
precedent might have less weight in the objective function of a judge. One need not,
however, go so far as to free judges from past precedents or ban judges from crafting
precedents.106 Precedents may reduce the risk burden of insurers,107 and they also
may help taxpayers arrange their affairs.108 Reduction of adjudicative costs may not
103. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARv. L. REV.
1539, 1573-93 (2017).
104. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643, 648-53 (2000) (explaining how
both vertical and horizontal stare decisis achieve savings in adjudication costs).
105. Id. at 654 ("[A] system that limits the Court's freedom to alter its precedent may
insulate a clearly erroneous precedent from further scrutiny and prevent its correction."); see
also Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1
(2001) (arguing for loosening stare decisis in cases of clear errors).
106. Courts that choose to create standards rather than rules sometimes eek to prevent the
standards from turning into rules by enacting "rules against rulification." Michael Coenen,
Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 646-48 (2014) (describing this practice).
Plausibly, a legislature could enact such rules in conjunction with an administrative program,
such as mandatory tax penalty insurance, if it determined that rulification would be harmful.
107. See infra Section II.A.
108. Some taxpayer responses to the legal regime amount to tax avoidance, but not all.
Sometimes, the goal of tax law is to stimulate a taxpayer response. See, e.g., Joshua D.
Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366-67, 374-75
(1988). If precedents help taxpayers better understand how to act under a standard, that may
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be the only justification for stare decisis. The standard account, sometimes
contested,109 is that uncertainty reduces commercial activity." On the other hand,
insurance prices could be stable and thus certain even where judges in individual
randomly selected cases have great discretion." Thus, the mandatory insurance
requirement, by insulating taxpayers from uncertainty, may reduce the commercial
benefits of legal certainty. 2 But it is also possible that insurance prices will shift
with political and other winds, creating uncertainty, at least if insureds are unable to
hedge against future insurance market increases. Thus, there remains justification for
some degree of precedential constraint.
Whether or not they create precedents, judicial decisions must not be so
idiosyncratic that the expectation of what an average judge will decide is overly
influenced by an outlier philosophy held only by a few judges. Suppose, for example,
that most judges would assess a particular tax at $1000 but 1% of judges would assess
the tax at $1,000,000. The expected average assessment would then be $10,990, far
from the median assessment of $1000. One might worry, moreover, that a small
number of judges would make extreme assessments so that they would have a
disproportionate effect on the average assessment. For example, a judge who wants
taxes to be modestly higher might pretend to want much higher taxes, in the hope of
influencing future insurers. This concern might easily be exaggerated. After all,
while juries or judges might sometimes issue damages much larger than expected,1 3
it seems doubtful that any decision makers announce damages much higher than they
believe appropriate in the hope of having a disproportionate influence on deterrence
incentives. Nonetheless, if one believes that the appropriate tax should be closer to
the median than to the average, one should favor having multiple judges on appellate
panels, perhaps even more than three.
Large judicial panels take resources. But, as we have seen before, the cost of
judicial services matters less in a regime in which the number of audits and thus the
number of adjudicated cases can easily be reduced artificially through random
selection. A byproduct of a system in which only a small percentage of tax filings
are reviewed is that each review that does occur can be much more careful, both in
the initial audit and in adjudication. Such greater care, moreover, may be essential
advance the goals underlying the standard.
109. The counterargument is that commercial activity often takes place in the face of
uncertainty-for example as firms engage in research and development (R&D) activities with
low probabilities of success. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Patently Uncertain, 17 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2019) (evaluating arguments about whether uncertainty in patent law is
harmful).
110. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1983).
111. D'Amato emphasizes that legal uncertainty breads judicial discretion, and that
prevents planning. See id. at 7. But with adequate insurance, regulated entities can immunize
themselves from risks associated with discretion.
112. Insurance similarly protects individual taxpayers. Uri Weiss argues that legal
uncertainty disproportionately harms poor people, because they are risk-averse and settlement
favors risk-neutral actors. See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect ofLegal Uncertainty, 2019 J.
DisP. RESOL. 149, 166, 185 (2019). If mandatory tax penalty insurance applied to such
taxpayers, however, this effect would be eliminated.
113. A doctrine that counteracts jury idiosyncrasy is remittitur. See, e.g., Blunt v. Little, 3
F. Cas. 760, 762 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578) (Story, J.) (reducing awarded damages).
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for three reasons. First, the stakes of adjudication will be much higher, given large
penalty multiples. Insurers will invest more in lawyers for each case, increasing case
complexity. Random selection should produce considerable savings relative to a
hypothetical system in which every tax filing is audited, however, because
investments in legal services have decreasing marginal returns."4 A case in which a
billion dollars is at stake will not cost a thousand times more to adjudicate than one
in which a million dollars is at stake. Multiplying stakes by a thousand means more
careful consideration, but not a thousand times longer oral argument or a thousand
times longer briefs. There is only so much that even great oral advocates can say.
Second, resources devoted to advocacy may be relatively unbalanced. Although
high multiples will likely lead insurers to hire highly competent counsel, the
government itself might not have the resources to engage equally powerful
advocates. That result might be avoided, should enabling legislation greatly increase
government funding for advocates to oppose taxpayers. The greater value that one
places on adversarial presentation of issues, the stronger the case for the government
to do this. But it is also possible to imagine a version of mandatory tax penalty
insurance that functions nonadversarially."5 The insurer's attorneys would seek to
persuade the auditor or appellate panel that the tax filing reflected an overpayment
or at least not much of an underpayment. If so, it is critical for the decision makers
to have ample resources to examine applicable evidence and conjure
counterarguments. Increasing the number of decision makers (whether with large
auditing teams or large judicial panels) and giving each decision maker more time
per case are two means of achieving this goal.
Third, standards may require greater judicial investment and thoughtfulness than
rules. A principal argument for mandatory tax penalty insurance is that it enables tax
provisions that focus more on substance than on form. In our existing judicial system,
standards may lead to unequal treatment, with results dependent on the happenstance
of which decision maker is drawn. With mandatory tax penalty insurance, the
insurers themselves may face this same arbitrariness, but their acceptance of this risk
justifies their profits. Insurers in turn have an incentive to project how different
auditors or judges might view an issue and then, depending on the procedure,
calculate a median, average, or something in between. This calculation, however,
may be different depending on how carefully insurers expect the decision makers to
consider the issue. The first impression that an average decision maker might have
on an issue will not reflect as much wisdom as that decision maker's judgment after
considerable reflection. The gulf between these might often be larger for standards,
which require open-ended rather than rote analysis. If one wants insurers to consider
subtleties rather than just superficialities, he or she must have reason to believe that
the eventual decision makers will consider those as well. If resolving standards in the
114. See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and
the Superiority ofthe Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305, 314-15 (2014) (offering a model
in which marginal benefits of litigation spending decrease as more is spent).
115. Analogously, the Social Security disability and veterans' benefits adjudication
systems do not assign parties the task of opposing benefit applications. See Hugh B. McClean,
Delay, Deny, Wait till They Die: Balancing Veterans' Rights and Non-A dversarial Procedures
in the VA Disability Benefits System, 72 SMU L. REv. 277, 285-86 (2019) (arguing for
incorporating some adversarial procedures).
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way that best promotes social welfare requires resort to disciplines such as economics
or philosophy, judges with such training and the time to engage relevant literatures
may be needed.
In short, the vision of decision-making entailed by mandatory tax penalty
insurance is one in which random selection artificially keeps disputes rare, but
disputes are handled with a degree of open-ended thoughtfulness not possible in most
systems of mass justice. This vision still leaves many open questions about
institutional design. An important question is whether tax penalty cases can settle
after the initial audit. An insurer could always decline to appeal.116 If proceedings are
adversarial, the government could be granted a right to appeal, and it might resolve
an insurer's appeal through a settlement. But settlement is less necessary in a regime
of random selection." If resource pressure leads to generous settlements, then
insurers might systematically certify tax filings for relatively low values, equal to the
amounts that they expect from settlements but less than the amounts that they would
expect to pay following full judicial review. Another important question is how
resources should be allocated between auditors and judges. A sufficiently strong and
thoughtful auditor pool reduces the importance of judging. If one expects reasoning
in the style of the common law to be especially effective in elaborating standards,
then more emphasis should be placed on judging. Auditors specialize in factfinding
and judges in legal reasoning, and the relative resources devoted to each depends on
the tax context.
D. Fraud and Forgiveness
One reason that auditors must retain a central role even with a high-quality
judiciary inheres in the need for factfinding. Limiting case development so that
decisions depend only on records submitted by taxpayers would invite fraud and even
forgery. If insurers do not expect audit and adjudication processes to detect errors
and fraud, then they have little incentive to ferret them out and indeed would have
incentives to look the other way. Mandatory tax penalty insurance creates a corps of
insurers acting as private auditors, and so long as such insurers exist, they might as
well play a role in identifying faulty filings. Tax filings, of course, may contain errors
that do not amount to fraud,18 and in such a case, an insurance company's response
would likely be to refuse to certify the tax filing unless the taxpayer agrees to a
greater tax liability. But sometimes an insurer might detect behavior that entails an
active intent to deceive or conceal. In such cases, insurers might be permitted or
encouraged to refer taxpayers to criminal authorities, and they might well have
incentives to do so to discourage other taxpayers from defrauding the insurance
116. One might discourage frivolous appeals by instituting a fee-shifting requirement. Cf
Robert M. Belden, Note, Protecting Winners: Why FRAP 7 Bonds Should Include Attorney
Fees, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 953, 982 (2015) (arguing for one-way fee shifting on appeal in
favor of winner at trial).
117. Settlement also has well-known vices, such as limiting the opportunity for
development of the law. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085
(1984).
118. Some tax provisions include exceptions for inadvertent errors. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 2005-10-028 (Dec. 17, 2004).
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companies, who would bear the burden of any fraud, should it be discovered after a
filing is randomly selected.119 The power to refer taxpayers, however, must not be
used as a club; insurers ought not be allowed to threaten a referral unless taxpayers
agree to a higher tax filing number.
Whether a fraud is detected as a result of a referral or a random selection, the
standard for proving criminal fraud would be the burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This high bar ensures that each enforcement system operates
independently: the penalty-refund multiplier insurance system, on one hand, and the
criminal fraud detection system, on the other. If one believes that taxpayers should
face some consequences for errors that fall short of fraud, then that can be
accomplished through policy deductibles.120 Mandatory insurance itself, however,
ensures that taxpayers will face considerably greater scrutiny than they would in a
system without it, as the government currently audits only a very small percentage
of returns.121 In principle, one might induce greater accuracy with civil penalties, but
then some taxpayers might file at levels more generous to the government than
insurers would expect government auditors and courts to assess. That is, risk-averse
taxpayers might be particularly cautious if the insurer certification does not act as a
full safe harbor because of a separate system of civil penalties. This reintroduces
horizontal inequity between cautious and aggressive taxpayers. Although criminal
penalties in principle might also lead to excess caution, a safe harbor for taxpayers
who provide information to insurers could address this concern. That is, insureds are
forgiven for fraud against the government so long as they shared the relevant
information with insurers.
The difficult question remains of what the effect of taxpayer fraud should be on
the insurers, when a tax return is randomly selected. We can compare two regimes.
In the first regime, the penalty or refund depends on the tax filing that the government
deems should have been filed given all information about the taxpayer. In such a
regime, the insurers will have more incentive to be aggressive in seeking out taxpayer
information. The insurers would price the risk of deception into the insurance price.
A concern about such a regime is that it might lead to discrimination. 122 In the second
regime, the penalty or refund depends on the tax filing that the government deems
would have been appropriate given the information actually provided by the
taxpayer. This regime is one in which the insurer is forgiven for the insured's fraud.
In that case, the insurer would not scrutinize too carefully. An in-between approach
would calculate the tax based on information that the insurer reasonably should have
found.
119. Alternatively, the law might prevent insurers from making such referrals, on grounds
similar to attorney-client privilege. One might argue, for example, that the possibility of a
fraud referral might chill taxpayer-insurer discussion. Cf Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that purpose of privilege is "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients"). This argument seems weak as to tax
penalty insurance; taxpayers will be more frank, not less, when they might be punished for
dishonesty.
120. See supra Section I.A.
121. See supra note 14.
122. See infra Section II.B.2.
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II. THE INSURANCE MARKET
With mandatory tax penalty insurance, the government will receive (from some
combination of the taxpayer and the insurer) the amount that the ex post audit process
would be expected to determine on average, and the taxpayer will pay that same
amount plus a premium to cover the insurer's costs and profits. For the regime to be
viable, this premium must not be too high. One reason that it might be high is if
insurers bear a high cost from assuming the risk associated with the penalty-refund
multipliers. Section 0 addresses this issue and suggests ways of reducing risk. Prices
also might be high in general because of lack of competition or for some taxpayers
in particular because of discrimination. Section 0 explains how legislation creating
the insurance market might mitigate these concerns.
A. Managing Risk
Some core design features of mandatory tax penalty insurance facilitate the
creation of an insurance market by reducing the total risk borne by insurance
companies. One is that the amount that insurance companies must pay in the event
that an underpayment is assessed is based on the underpayment rather than on the tax
bill as a whole. An alternative would be for taxpayers to pay their taxes to insurance
companies, with the insurance companies then paying to the government the product
of the entire assessed tax bill and the multiplier in randomly selected cases. But that
would greatly increase the stakes inherent in the randomization of cases. In Section
IIA.1, we will consider another significant design feature designed to reduce
insurance companies' risk-the promise that an insurer will receive a refund if the
taxpayer is found to have overpaid, according to the same multiple. This reduces risk
because it is the only approach that will likely lead insurers to certify insureds' tax
liability based on expected assessments.
Still, even with these design features, the use of large multipliers entails risk for
the insurer. This risk can be disaggregated into two components: risk associated with
the random selection of which filings are audited and risk associated with how
particular audits proceed. Risk associated with the random number function is a
relatively small concern, however. This is so in part because of the law of large
numbers;2 3 the greater the number of tax filings that an insurer has, the less the
insurer's percentage return will vary based on which filings happen to be chosen.
The insurer, moreover, can play an active role in reducing risk associated with which
filings are randomly selected. We have seen that an insurer should be able to "link"
policies so that some are automatically randomized together or separately.24 If the
multiplier is 1000, an insurer could divide all filings into 1000 groups, each with
similar total exposure. An insurer with a smaller number of filings could reduce risk
using other techniques, such as purchasing reinsurance on the randomization itself.1 5
123. See generally L. Eeckhoudt, L. Bauwens, E. Briys & P Scarmure, The Law ofLarge
(Small?) Numbers and the Demand for Insurance, 58 J. RISK & INS. 438 (1991) (explaining
the relevance of diversification for insurers).
124. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
125. Because the randomization is transparent, there would be no adverse selection or
moral hazard afflicting a policy based solely on the result of the randomization, rather than on
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The greater concern is that insurance companies will have a reasonably large
amount at stake with each case randomly selected for adjudication, and even the best
insurer cannot eliminate this risk through accurate pricing, because government
auditors may be unpredictable. A policy lever to affect this amount is the assessment
rate, which indirectly determines the penalty-refund multiplier. A high rate of
government assessment will cost more resources but will limit insurance companies'
risk. An insurance company should easily be able to absorb the risk of penalties in
the tens of millions of dollars. Insurance companies, after all, are vehicles for risk
spreading. But if individual cases might produce liability in the tens of billions of
dollars, the cost of bearing that risk may be large. Thus, this counsels against a
system, to take an extreme example, in which only one tax filing is randomly sampled
with the multiplier set at the number of tax filings. We assume that the government
is risk neutral,126 but even that might not be the case when randomness might cause
it to gain or lose hundreds of billions of dollars. Thus, in setting the probability of
audit, the government must balance the goal of saving government resources
(counseling toward a low audit rate) with the goal of reducing insurer risk
(counseling toward a high rate). This balance can comfortably be accommodated
with audit rates much lower and penalty rates much higher than in our conventional
tax system.
The government also may exercise a policy lever that may lead insurers to devote
fewer or greater resources to the task of assessing taxpayers' individual liability.
Specifically, as discussed in Section II.A.2.i, the government may offer to provide
some portion of the insurance received by taxpayers, at the same price paid by
taxpayers to their insurers. This approach has no effect on the probability of audit,
but it lowers insurance companies' multipliers. The government also could
accomplish the reverse by requiring insurers to sell to the government a policy
equivalent to the taxpayer's; this would raise the insurance companies' multipliers
and thus increase the effort that insurance companies would invest. This policy lever
highlights a separate trade-off between cost reduction and greater accuracy in
insurance pricing. When the government exercises this policy lever, however, it must
be careful to prevent side payments between taxpayers and insurers. 121
Another exotic modification to the mandatory tax penalty system to reduce
insurance company risk is multistage assessment. Discussed in Section II.A.2.ii, this
approach requires an insurer to buy a special type of reinsurance policy after a tax
filing is randomly selected. Then, a further random selection will occur with the
reinsurer's penalty-refund multiple dependent on the selection probability in this
second assessment and the original insurer's penalty-refund multiple dependent on
the result of the audit following the randomization. See Michael Abramowicz, Tax
Experimentation, 71 FLA. L. REv. 65, 103-04 (2019) (suggesting that individuals subject to
governmental randomization be allowed to purchase insurance on the randomization from the
government at actuarially fair rates).
126. Rappaport, supra note 103, at 1552 ("The government is risk neutral, we typically
assume, because it can spread its risks across a broad base of taxpayers and diversify them by
owning varied investments.").
127. Cf Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent
Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 289, 293-94 (2007) (discussing another insurance
context in which side payments are an issue).
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the original selection probability and the price of the reinsurance. The first insurer is
disciplined not by an actual governmental assessment but by expectations of
reinsurers about such an assessment. These expectations might be developed very
quickly after the first randomization, largely on the basis of research that the
reinsurers have already performed on the processes of the original insurers. This
mechanism adds some complexity, but it insulates the initial insurers from
randomness associated with the selection of a particular government assessor or with
randomness in any particular assessor's assessment. In effect, it subjects two
insurance companies to relatively small penalty multipliers instead of a single
company to a much larger penalty multiplier equal to the product of the relatively
small ones. If the initial insurers have a reputation for requiring taxpayers to pay on
average what they owe, the insurers will pay or receive an amount close to zero, even
if the ultimate government assessment is noisy.
Government co-provision of insurance and multistage assessment are extensions
to the mandatory tax penalty insurance system not likely to be included even in any
initial experiments. Any implementation of mandatory tax penalty insurance,
however, will need to guarantee that insurers are solvent. If insurers are unable to
pay penalties owed after random selection, the government will lose money. More
fundamentally, however, the prospect of not paying will distort the insurance market,
with insurers that anticipate some probability of bankruptcy able to offer lower prices
to customers. As Section II.A.3 explains, reinsurance provides an answer to this
problem. The answer is the typical one for insurance regulation, so reinsurance
requirements should be straightforward to implement even in early experiments with
mandatory tax penalty insurance.
1. Refunds for Overpayments
Why should insurers receive a refund when insureds are found to have underpaid
after being randomly selected for audit? One might object that he insurer is being
"rewarded" for inaccuracy, receiving money for having insisted that insureds declare
higher tax liability than a governmental assessment later concluded was appropriate.
The accurate retort is that if insurance companies bear the risk of certifying tax
liability that is found to be too low, then they must offset that risk by receiving
benefits should the certification be found too high. Anticipated refunds reduce the
cost of insurance and are necessary to give insurance companies appropriate
incentives. A system of symmetric refunds for overpayments and penalties for
underpayments, subject to the same multiplier, means that the sum of the insured's
payment to the government, plus any penalty assessment or minus any refund
granted, will be the same on average no matter what is reported on the tax return.
Assuming that insurers are accurate on average in their predictions of what the
government would assess, the government's initial total receipts will approximately
equal the amount that it would assess if it hypothetically had the resources to assess
every filing with the same care that it will apply to the randomly assessed filings, and
the amount that insurers pay for underpayments will equal the amount that insurers
receive for overpayments.
An alternative would be to subject insurers to penalties only. It might seem that
these penalties could be smaller since the insurers would expect no reward. But in
fact, the penalties still must be equally high. Suppose, for example, that the result of
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the government assessment is entirely predictable, because the tax can be objectively
calculated without error. In that case, an underpayment is akin to stealing from the
government, and the insurer could be deterred only by making the penalty multiplier
the same as before: the inverse of the probability of audit. 128 Thus, the expected total
payment (the insured's payment plus the expected penalty) will be the same for any
amount initially paid up to the actual tax liability. Thus, even with perfect
information, penalties must be just as high, so eliminating rewards has no effect. But
the elimination of rewards will change insurer behavior if there is uncertainty about
how the government might assess a particular taxpayer's liability. With the penalty
multiple set at the inverse of the probability of assessment, the insurer's incentive
will be to certify the lowest possible tax liability.
Suppose, for example, that half of government assessors would be expected to
assess tax liability at $100,000 and half would assess liability at $150,000, and that
1% of returns will be randomly selected for audit. Then, with a penalty multiplier of
100, the insurer's incentive will be to certify the insured's tax liability at $100,000.
If it does this, then the insurer can expect to pay $25,000 in penalties. 129 To be able
to pay this amount, a risk-neutral insurance company will charge the insured this
$25,000, in addition to charges to cover its expenses and profit. If the insurer certifies
a higher tax liability, then the total expected payment will be higher. Raising the
penalty multiplier and holding constant the audit probability would increase the
insured's total expected payment to more than $125,000,130 and past a certain tipping
point would lead the insurer to certify liability at $150,000.131 The optimizations are
corner solutions, and there is no penalty multiplier that will lead the insurer to certify
liability at the expected level of $125,000. In principle, a nonlinear penalty multiplier
might produce interior solutions leading to certification at this level, but in the
absence of governmental knowledge of the distribution of assessments, there is no
way to produce a formula that will generally lead to certification at the expected
value with penalties alone. Thus, with penalties alone, to obtain revenue equal to
expected assessments, the government would need to continue to set the penalty
multiplier at the inverse of the probability of assessment. Insurers would certify tax
at the lowest possible level and increase their fees sufficiently to pay the expected
penalties.
128. The possibility of multiplying tax penalties by the inverse of the probability of
detection is not new. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for
Moderate Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAx L. REv. 453, 457 n.7 (2011) (stating that the idea "is
commonplace in the literature on deterrence") (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)). What is new is the suggestion that
requiring insurance makes this approach feasible in some contexts.
129. The chance of paying the penalty will be 1/100 (the probability of audit) times 1/2
(the probability of an assessment of $150,000) = 1/200. With this probability, the insurer will
be penalized ($150,000 - $100,000) * 100, so the expected penalty is 1/200 * $50,000 * 100
= $25,000.
130. The previous footnote shows that with a penalty multiplier of 100, the expected
liability when certifying tax at $100,000 is $25,000. With a higher penalty multiplier, it will
thus be greater than $25,000.
131. The tipping point occurs when the penalty multiplier is 200. At this level, the expected
penalty is $150,000 for any tax certification below $150,000. At any higher level, the
insurance company's best strategy is to insist on a certification of $150,000.
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This works mathematically, but it has some negative consequences. First, it may
lead to a distorted sense among taxpayers about where their funds are going.
Taxpayers may think of the certified amount as the tax liability and the fee to the
insurance company as an extortionate payment. From a transparency perspective, it
is better if the insurance company can be induced to certify the insured's tax filings
at the expected assessment level. This is better not only with respect to
underinformed taxpayers but also with respect to informed taxpayers and officials.
If the formula leads insurers to certify at the expected level-and insurers that bear
even a small cost of risk and are thus a tiny bit risk-averse would have an incentive
to take this approach132-then it is straightforward to determine just how much
insurers are charging insureds. Because penalties and rewards can be expected to
cancel out on average, the amount that insureds pay to insurance companies, as
distinct from the amount that insureds pay to the government, represents the cost of
providing the insurance plus any insurance company profit.
Second, the penalties-only approach increases the amount of risk that an insurance
company must bear. Even though insurance companies are efficient risk bearers,
there may be some cost to bearing risk, a cost which the insurance company will pass
along to the insured. With the penalties-only approach, an insurance company's
incentive will always be to certify at the lowest possible assessed level, and the
company will expect to pay relatively large fines whenever there is uncertainty about
the total tax due. This might not be a problem when the tax law is completely clear,
but mandatory tax penalty insurance does the least work when tax law is entirely
predictable. With a combined penalties and rewards approach, by contrast, the
announcement that a case has been randomly selected will not much affect the
insurance company. Yes, the insurer will bear costs in litigating the assessment, but
if it has done its job right, then its expected profits should be equal to its expected
refunds.
That does not conclusively resolve the issue. If the optics of refunds are
sufficiently bad, then a mandatory tax penalty insurance scheme could work with
penalties only. In this case, however, it might even make sense for the system to
change so that the taxpayer's payment is made entirely to the insurance company. To
extend the art tax hypothetical, the taxpayer would pay the art tax to the insurance
company. This makes comparison shopping easier for taxpayers. A taxpayer simply
needs to find the insurance company that will accept the lowest tax payment. It also
eliminates the optics problem from low certifications and high insurance fees. Then,
the insurance company could choose to forward some of the amount that it receives
on to the government, and if even slightly risk-averse, its incentive would be to
forward the minimum amount that any assessor would conclude is due, just as its
incentive in the penalties-only certification scheme is to certify the lowest possible
132. On the other hand, insurers might have an incentive to reduce their fees and underpay
on average, in order to persuade consumers that their rates are low. This could be combatted
by providing historical information to consumers. See infra Section II.B.3. Another approach
might be to combine the large penalty-reward system with an additional system in which
insurers are given rewards if their assessments on average are close in absolute value terms to
the government's and penalized otherwise. Relatively inaccurate insurers might be made to
make payments to accurate insurers so that this change in the formula would cause no
systematic change in the total amount paid by taxpayers.
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tax assessment. This approach does not address the concerns about the amount of
risk that an insurance company is being asked to bear, but it does address concerns
that consumers might be confused about why their insurance companies' bills are so
high. Still, it does not fully advance the goal of transparency, as there would be no
easy way to disaggregate the categories of expected tax and administrative fees.
2. Multiplier Reduction Strategies
Other techniques might be used to reduce the multipliers and thus the total
potential risk that insurers must bear. One technique is for the government to provide
taxpayers insurance directly but at a price based on the amount paid to the taxpayers'
insurers. The other is for staged randomization, in which an insurer is assessed not
directly by an audit but instead by a requirement hat it purchase reinsurance for the
specific transaction, with the reinsurer then subject to yet another random selection.
A drawback of both of these techniques is that they add complications to the design
of mandatory tax penalty insurance. Part of the appeal of mandatory tax penalty
insurance is that, even though it is unfamiliar, it offers a fairly simple mechanism for
the government to achieve widespread, honest private assessment of taxpayer
returns, a combination of an insurance requirement and an audit mechanism. The
multiplier reduction strategies discussed here are considerably less intuitive. They
are best considered potential future improvements to mandatory tax penalty
insurance, should early experimentation be successful.
i. Government-Provided Insurance Matching
The government might provide a specified portion of the insurance to be
purchased by taxpayers. Suppose, for example, that the multiplier was set at 100, but
the government provided that for each dollar worth of insurance purchased by a
taxpayer, it would sell an additional nine dollars' worth of insurance to the taxpayer.
Under this regime, a taxpayer might pay $1000 for insurance from a private insurer,
and the government would then require the taxpayer to pay it an additional $9000 for
further insurance. The private insurer's multiplier would then be only 10 instead of
100. The approach is equivalent to a simple tax. With the above example, the
government could charge a 900% tax on insurance and lower the multiplier from 100
to 10. The greater the tax the government charges, the more it can lower the
multiplier.
With government-provided insurance matching, the government would be relying
on the private sector to set prices. Such reliance highlights that mandatory tax penalty
insurance is a system in which the government is piggybacking on the efforts of
private parties because it believes that private parties will be able to determine tax
more accurately or cheaply than the government can through formal audits. If this
were not true, there would be no reason for mandatory tax penalty insurance. The
government could simply audit everyone. Presumably, the government does not do
this today because it is too expensive, in part because due process protections create
rights that can increase the cost of procedures,133 and also because mandatory tax
133. The process to which one is entitled may depend in part on the cost of that process.
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penalty insurance will produce market equilibrium prices that may provide taxpayers
more consistent results than governmental audits in which individual auditors may
be idiosyncratic. But just because the government is relying on the private sector
does not mean that the total private sector effort in assessing individual income tax
liability will be set at an optimal level.134
The total amount that insurance companies spend assessing taxpayers, plus the
amount that taxpayers spend in cooperating with such assessments, could be socially
excessive relative to the benefit inherent in accuracy. An insurer will invest in
research into an individual tax filing until the marginal benefit to the insurer from
doing so equals the investment's cost. Greater research means that the insurer will
be better able to calculate a taxpayer's eventual liability and less likely to insure a
high-risk taxpayer at too low a price. It also decreases the chance that the insurer will
charge too much to insure a low-risk taxpayer, but this possibility will not cancel out
the other because the low-risk taxpayer may shop for a new insurer. In principle, the
government matching should be set at a level where the marginal benefit of increased
accuracy equals the marginal cost of resources spent by insurers on determining how
to price insurance. Unfortunately, there exists no obvious process for determining
just what this optimal level is. Increased accuracy matters both for efficiency reasons
(tax distortions will be minimized when consumers cannot ake advantage of
mispricing) and for equity reasons (inaccurate pricing means that similarly situated
taxpayers will pay different tax bills), so benefits of accuracy are difficult to measure.
A system in which there is no government matching may not be optimal, but it
has the virtue of administrative simplicity. If there is government matching, there is
a danger for corrupt activity. In particular, a taxpayer might seek to give a "side
payment" to an insurer. If the side payment is undisclosed to the government, then
the government will be providing its additional insurance at a reduced price.
Taxpayers who successfully engage in such behavior should be expected to pay less
in taxes than other similarly situated taxpayers. One must worry not just about
explicit side payments of cash but also other types of value that insureds might give
insurers. For example, an insurer might give a break to a government official in
assessing the government official's personal taxes, in the hope of lenient regulatory
treatment. Similarly, an insurer might give a break to its own employees, in essence
providing a form of compensation not subject to tax law. Or, an insurer might give a
break to customers who purchase unrelated types of insurance. Policing these
payments could be difficult and is unnecessary in the absence of government-
provided insurance matching.
The above analysis assumes that the government wishes to reduce the multiples
that insurance companies charge and thus the amount of effort that insurance
companies will invest in researching insureds. In theory, however, it could be
possible that total insurer investment will be so suboptimally low that insurers might
issue policies based on crude proxies, because investigation of taxpayers is simply
too expensive to do effectively. If this were true, the simplest remedy would be to
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Still, any governmental process may be more
expensive than private ordering transactions.
134. Analogously, Jack Hirshleifer famously showed that investment in the stock market
could be socially excessive. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value ofInformation
and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 561, 571 (1971).
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increase multipliers. With greater multipliers, insurers will face a larger risk burden
for each policy and thus will spend more time deciding what tax filing to insist on
before agreeing to certify it. Such a proposal can be conceived of as the flip side of
government-provided insurance matching if the government provides money to the
insurer in exchange for these greater multipliers. The government might in effect buy
insurance from the insurer equivalent to what the taxpayer is receiving from the
insurer at a commensurate price. For example, with a multiplier of 100, the
government might pay twice what the insured pays for insurance. The insurer would
then pay out at a multiplier of 300. This illustrates that the number of audits
performed need not be linked to the multiplier. The government can increase the
insurer's effective multiplier (and thus incentives to investigate the taxpayer) by
matching the insureds' payments to the insurer, and it can decrease the insurer's
effective multiplier by taxing the insureds' payments to the insurer. The more
straightforward approach to generating higher multipliers, however, is simply to plan
fewer audits.
ii. Staged Randomization
Another approach that a government implementing mandatory tax penalty
insurance might adopt to reduce the multipliers that insurance companies must face
is what we might call "staged randomization." The key intuition underlying this
approach is that the amount an insurer ought to pay as penalty or receive as refund
should depend on a reasonable expectation of the result of an audit, not on the actual
result of an audit. If, for example, there is a good reason to believe that, on average,
an insurer has certified taxpayer returns at the correct level, so that the expected
amount assessed equals taxpayer payments to the government on average, then no
penalty or multiplier needs to be imposed, even if it turns out that a randomly selected
taxpayer might have paid too little or too much. The critique inherent in this point is
that the insurer is facing risk associated with random factors such as which auditor
is selected for a particular taxpayer and whether a randomly selected taxpayer
happens to be one that the insurer undercharged or overcharged. It may seem that
this observation gets us nowhere, however, because the audits are the mechanism by
which we estimate whether the insurer has charged the appropriate amount on
average. If we do not subject the insurer to this mechanism, then we must find some
other way of determining insurer accuracy. Yet we have already seen that with
random selection of cases for auditing, the penalty-refund multiplier uniquely
guarantees the insurer's incentive for accuracy.1 35
The trick is for an original insurer's liability to depend on its ability to buy
insurance from another insurance company. For example, suppose that a multiplier
of 100 applies to the original insurance. As soon as a tax filing is randomly selected,
the government might publicly announce some limited information about it. This
information must include the amount of the tax filing and the identity of the insurer,
but no other information need be provided. Quite quickly after the announcement,
before any reinsurers would have an opportunity to conduct any research to identify
the specific taxpayers, and without any information about the identity of a particular
135. See supra Section H.A.l.
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auditor, the reinsurers would bid on the right to serve as the reinsurer, with the lowest
bid winning the contract. Later, the reinsurance contract will be subject to a
randomization of its own with its own multiplier. Suppose, for example, that the
multiplier this time is 50. Then, with a 1 in 50 probability, the underlying tax filing
will in fact be audited, and the reinsurer will face a penalty of 50 times the
underpayment or a reward of 50 times the overpayment. The idea is that the reinsurer
bids not based on information about particular taxpayers but based on its information
about the insurers. Thus, reinsurers' incentives would be to study the procedures of
particular first-stage insurers, perhaps even sampling some policies issued by these
insurers, to determine whether to issue reinsurance. Thus, the government only needs
to audit 1 in 5000 tax filings, and yet no individual insurer faces more than a
multiplier of 100. In theory, one could have three or four stages of insurance.
The principal challenge is determining just what the first-level insurer should pay
or receive. Conceptually, this is easy. The bid of the reinsurer reflects the amount
that the reinsurer will expect to pay should the policy be randomly selected a second
time, plus the reinsurer's costs-including the cost of researching the original
insurers, the cost of bearing risk, and the cost of adjudicating any tax filings randomly
selected again-as well as the profit margin. The first part of this should determine
what the first insurer pays. In practice, however, it will not be obvious how to
disaggregate the expectation from the low bid itself in any particular case. At least
two strategies might give a close approximation. The first is to build a model
predicting the actual amount eventually assessed based on the low bid after the
second auction. Such a model would allow reconstruction of the bidding market's
expectation of how much the first bidder would owe. If the low-bidder reinsurers
believe that the original insurers are no more likely to have overestimated tax liability
than to have underestimated it, then this expectation should be close to zero.
Accordingly, the original insurers would face very low payments to or refunds from
the government. The market check functions as a disciplining mechanism that serves
as an alternative to subjecting the original insurers to a huge multiplier.
The alternative strategy eschews aggregate statistics, instead asking that the
reinsurer predict the result of any adjudication. Should the filing be randomly
selected again, then the reinsurer will earn some money if the prediction is relatively
good and pay out some money if the prediction is relatively bad. The prediction itself
must remain secret during the tax assessment; otherwise, the reinsurer would have
an incentive to make a rosy prediction to persuade an auditor that it really does
believe in its case. The conversion of the prediction and result into a payment by or
to the reinsurer can be made according to a "strictly proper scoring rule," 136 that is a
rule that guarantees the honest revelation of beliefs about the possible distribution of
some value, under the assumption that the party subject to the scoring rule acts
rationally and that the choice affects the party only via the scoring rule.137 The
advantage of this approach is that it reflects a reinsurer's actual views about the
136. See generally Kenneth C. Lichtendahl Jr. & Robert L. Winkler, Probability
Elicitation, Scoring Rules, and Competition Among Forecasters, 53 MGMT. Sc'. 1745 (2007)
(discussing strictly proper scoring rules).
137. Side payments from first insurers to reinsurers would void this assumption. See supra
p. 140. The government should seek to ensure that no company plays a role, even through
subsidiaries, in both the original and reinsurance tax penalty markets.
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merits of an original insurer for a particular type of tax filing. The disadvantage is
that any particular reinsurer could have outlier views. This danger dooms the
insurance scheme no more than idiosyncrasy in tax auditing would. The original
insurer would face risk in the form of uncertainty about how a reinsurer might
evaluate it, but such uncertainty would likely be much smaller than in the absence of
staged randomization.
3. Reinsurance
The reinsurers imagined in the previous Section are a specialized sort, reducing
the risk faced by the original insurer by themselves being subject to a random audit
with a penalty/reward multiple. Regardless of whether such reinsurance is used,
however, some form of reinsurance will be needed for mandatory tax penalty
insurance to work. Suppose that an insurer participating in the mandatory tax penalty
market did not have reinsurance and that there was some probability that it would go
bankrupt and be unable to pay any penalties owed to the government. This insurer
enjoys all of the upside of the tax penalty insurance, in the event that it turns out to
have overestimated tax penalty liability in cases randomly selected for audit, but
avoids a portion of the downside through bankruptcy. Thus, it should be able to sell
its insurance product more cheaply than other insurers. The market equilibrium may
thus be one in which the sellers of mandatory tax penalty insurance are fly-by-night
operations unable to meet their obligations, perhaps even operations placing a risky
bet on the hope that none or few of their taxpayer customers are randomly selected
for audit.
The problem is more acute than with ordinary insurance. Insureds generally have
some incentive to buy insurance from companies that they expect to remain fiscally
solvent, because otherwise the company might not be there for them when a calamity
occurs and the insurance payment is needed. 138 But taxpayers do not have such an
incentive. While one could provide that a taxpayer should be liable if its insurer is
unable to pay an assessed penalty, this reintroduces the risk of excessive penalties
that our current tax system and mandatory tax penalty insurance are designed to
avoid. Assuming that only the insurer remains liable for penalties or rewards, then
the taxpayer has no incentive to factor solvency into insurance purchase decisions.
Even with ordinary insurance, however, the government helps limit insolvency
risk.139 It does this through a variety of mechanisms, including, for example,
imposition of capital requirements." But no mechanism is as important as
reinsurance, which uses the discipline of market pricing to make expected solvency
138. Consumers, however, have limited information, and thus there is a danger that if
insurers could choose their regulators, a race to the bottom would occur. See Daniel Schwarcz,
Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against Regulatory
Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1742 (2010).
139. See Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, The Effectiveness ofPublic and Private
Sector Summary Risk Measures in Predicting Insurer Insolvencies, 21 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 101
(2002) (discussing solvency regulation).
140. See, e.g., Kris DeFrain, US. Insurance Financial Regulatory Oversight and the Role





a condition of continued operation.14 1 Rather than analyze an insurer's assets and
practices, the government can simply look for reinsurance guarantees.
A potential objection is that this merely pushes the government's solvency task to
a greater level of abstraction. The government will need to assure itself of the
solvency of reinsurers rather than of the original insurers. But the government
already regulates reinsurers, 142 and so mandatory tax penalty insurance, coupled with
a requirement that the original insurers obtain reinsurance, adds little in the way of
regulatory complexity. Reinsurance companies do not generally specialize in any one
form of insurance. The fact that a reinsurance company includes ordinary casualty
policies provides some evidence that it is not merely a smokescreen to make the
original insurer look more solvent than it in fact is. One can never be sure that
reinsurance will be adequate, because it is always possible that casualty losses will
be much higher than expected. But mandatory tax penalty insurance may be more
predictable and less of a correlated risk than, say, hurricane losses,14 3 because tax
penalty insurance is a bet on the acts of humans rather than on acts of God. Thus,
reinsurers will likely be willing to take on such risk, and any remaining possibility
of bankruptcy at he reinsurer level seems unlikely to have a significant effect on
market efficiency overall.
B. Enhancing Competition
If insurance is available from only a small number of insurers, then insurers might
engage in oligopolistic pricing, transferring wealth from taxpayers to insurance
companies. Rent dissipation theory suggests that the possibility of obtaining such
rents from taxpayers will lead insurers to invest resources in securing those rents,14 4
so on this account taxpayers would still be paying insurers' costs, but those costs
include monies spent for rent seeking. In expectation, on this theory, insurers still
earn zero economic profit.14 5 Whether or not this holds, any increase in the cost of
insurance will harm taxpayers, and any such private harm must be weighed against
any social benefits that the insurance provides. Moreover, this is not the only market
imperfection with which we might be concerned. If insurance companies engage in
discrimination, for example, the negative social ramifications of such discrimination
could more than offset any improvement in horizontal equity between risk-averse
and relatively risk-neutral taxpayers. Meanwhile, if some taxpayers find it difficult
141. Just as insurance serves a regulatory function for entities that must purchase it, so too
does reinsurance serve a regulatory function for insurance companies. See Aviva Abramovsky,
Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 375-77 (2009).
142. For a description of how regulators guard against he insolvency of ordinary insurers
by regulating reinsurance, see Gregory Arnold, The Doubtful Impact of an Optional Federal
Charter on the Reinsurance Collateral Debate, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 79, 80-88
(2008).
143. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
144. The classic work on rent dissipation is Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967), which argues that the full costs of monopoly
must include the destructive competition to obtain a monopoly position.
145. The literature, however, leaves open the possibility that rent dissipation will be
incomplete. See, e.g., Chris Paul & Al Wilhite, Rent-Seeking, Rent-Defending, and Rent
Dissipation, 71 PUB. CHOICE 61, 61 (1991) (summarizing different models).
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to obtain information about insurers, then those taxpayers may end up paying too
much for their insurance.
This Part thus assesses what role the government might play in establishing a
relatively competitive, discrimination-free market for insurance. Those skeptical and
even those not so skeptical of existing insurance will reasonably doubt that a perfect
market is possible, and the ultimate case for mandatory tax penalty insurance
depends on how close to the ideal the system can come. There is, however, one
reason that this insurance market could be more competitive than most insurance
markets: because taxpayers transfer all risk to insurers, the informational challenge
of choosing among competing insurers is greatly reduced. In enacting mandatory tax
penalty insurance, moreover, the government could include safeguards that would
strengthen competition. Section IIB.1 explains that if monopoly is a concern, the
enabling legislation could limit each insurer's market share. Similarly, Section II.B.2
argues that the government could include custom antidiscrimination provisions that
would guarantee that individuals in suspect classes pay no more than appears
justified based on the cases randomly selected for adjudication. Finally, Section
II.B.3 describes how the government might improve consumer information about
various insurers so that consumers may shop effectively for the insurer willing to
offer a policy for the lowest amount.
1. Antimonopoly
A preliminary step to ensuring competition would be to ensure uniform law in the
jurisdiction. For example, if mandatory tax penalty insurance were created as a
creature of federal law for federal taxes, then the insurers likely should be regulated
under federal law, rather than under the disparate laws of each state. The doctrine 46
and history 47 of federal regulation of insurance are complex,148 but the question is
clearer here than in other contexts.149 Tax penalty insurance would be a new form of
insurance created by the federal government, concerning solely liability of taxpayers
to the federal government, and so the federal government regulating such insurance
would seem appropriate. With a single regulator, insurance companies would be able
to sell insurance across the entire United States. Moreover, the regulator could focus
146. See David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 507, 514-18 (2008) (discussing federal preemption).
147. See generally A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP.
L. REV. 297, 303-17 (2003) (providing history of preemption).
148. Unlike the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, "[t]he business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a). See generally Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal
Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1993) (suggesting partial federalization);
Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of State and Federal
Authority over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1389 (2015) (explaining how the federal
government has made and might further make inroads into state regulation).
149. The debate about whether insurance companies should be able to market the same
policies to multiple states' citizens has been especially acute in health care. See, e.g., Steven
G. Calabresi, The Right to Buy Health Insurance Across State Lines: Crony Capitalism and
the Supreme Court, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1447 (2013).
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on ensuring that entry barriers are relatively low but that insurers still have adequate
reinsurance.15 1 Many companies compete across the United States in existing
insurance markets, and a large number of existing companies and potential startups
would at least be interested in this new market.
Interest by many companies in selling insurance, however, will not necessarily
translate to a market equilibrium in which a large number of companies compete. A
critical question is whether there are significant economies of scale. On one hand,
the need of tax penalty insurers to scrutinize individual taxpayers' returns might
suggest a need for relatively small-scale operation. The market for tax accounting
services offers an analogy. There are some large firms15 but also many individuals
and small firms that compete with them, so the market, as a whole, appears to be
reasonably competitive, at least for routine work for ordinary taxpayers. On the other
hand, there may be economies of scale in developing procedures and statistical
analyses to improve forecasts of whether the government will underpay or overpay
particular taxpayers.
The market equilibrium likely will be somewhere in between oligopoly and
perfect competition. A decisive consideration likely preventing mom-and-pop
insurers from emerging is that small entities cannot effectively spread risk. On the
other hand, reinsurers may hesitate to contract with insurers with dominant market
concentration. Each tax penalty insurance policy represents a nonsystematic risk
relative to ordinary assets such as stocks and bonds. But there may be correlation
among many tax penalty insurance policies, particularly policies issued by the same
insurer, because that insurer could have personnel, procedures, or statistical models
that lead it to underestimate the possibility of understatement. If so, the unit cost of
reinsurance may increase in the number of policies that any insurer offers. Thus,
reinsurance may provide a natural bulwark against heavy market concentration.
Insurance markets may be highly concentrated with only a few firms yet not price
insurance significantly above insurers' costs. Even with only a few providers, it will
be difficult for insurers to collude to maintain high prices, because tax liability must
be assessed individually. Given the heterogeneity of taxpayer circumstances, it
would be difficult for members of an insurance cartel to define an implicit agreement
about pricing levels, and that, in turn, would tend to undermine the cartel.152
Meanwhile, should a firm attempt to monopolize the market-for example, by
aggressively merging with other insurers-then antitrust law could provide an
obstacle. 153 A common problem for antitrust law is that some firms gain dominant
positions by outcompeting other firms and then take advantage of network effects to
consumers' potential detriment. 154 The tax penalty insurance market seems unlikely
150. See supra Section II.A.3.
151. Today, there are four leading accounting firms, and large corporations are effectively
constrained to choose one of them. See Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REv. 1517,
1543 (2013).
152. Cf Marco A. Marini, Collusive Agreements in Vertically Differentiated Markets
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei [FEEM], Working Paper No. 29, 2017) (It.) (offering a model
in which cartels are less stable with many products of different quality).
153. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2 (making "attempt to monopolize" a felony); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010).
154. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and
Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision
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to be one with significant network effects. Some insurers may operate more
efficiently, as a result of process or technological advantages, but dominance does
not seem inevitable.
If, however, all of this is not assurance enough, a straightforward solution exists:
The legislature creating a mandatory tax penalty insurance regime could limit the
maximum market share of any one insurer-for example, to 10%. Even if one
generally believes that antitrust law should be uniform across markets, the market
for tax penalty insurance is unique because it exists solely as a creation of the legal
regime, not because insureds face some inherent risk. One implication of this is that
market definition is straightforward, as the applicable market would be the insurance
fulfilling some regulatory requirement, such as one of the applications in Part 0. Just
a single product is for sale, and market share should be mechanical to measure. For
example, the market share of each policy might be the sum of the insurance price and
the tax filing amount certified by the government.1 5 5 Explicit market share limitations
may seem unfamiliar, and one could reject them as preventing useful economies of
scale. But it would be bizarre to reject the legal regime on the ground that too few
insurers would compete. The remedy of limiting market share can be implemented
easily, should concerns about insufficient competition be weighty.
2. Antidiscrimination
A pernicious form of market imperfection is discrimination on the basis of
categories such as race, national origin, and religion.156 One danger is that insurers
might insist on higher certifications for groups than would be warranted by the tax
itself. The likelihood of this form of discrimination depends on the application. If,
for example, mandatory tax penalty insurance applied to transfer pricing,157 the
applicable taxpayers would likely all be businesses, and antidiscrimination would
likely be a relatively small concern. With our hypothetical art tax, however, one
might plausibly wonder whether irrelevant characteristics might consciously or
unconsciously affect insurance companies' judgments. If, for example, insurance
company employees harbor a stereotype that individuals in some group are less
honest than individuals in another group, then they might be inclined to predict that
those individuals are withholding information and thus insist on higher certifications.
This concern, however, would be mitigated if, as recommended above, insurers bear
no responsibility when the insured hides information from the insurer, so long as the
insurer has exercised reasonable diligence.
Making, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 317 (1995) (assessing implication of network externalities for
antitrust).
155. The insurance price alone might be more appropriate if it can be distinguished from
the tax paid. See supra text accompanying note 132.
156. The tradition of treating discrimination as a market phenomenon dates to Gary S.
Becker. THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). For an explanation of how race
discrimination can persist even with market competition, see Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003 (1995).
157. See infra Section III.A.
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Insurers, however, might insist on higher certifications for protected groups or
greater prices for insurance not because of assumptions about honesty, but simply
because they believe that such groups expect to be cheated and are less likely to
respond by seeking alternative suppliers. For example, studies indicate that new-car
dealers quote lower prices to white males than to blacks or females.158 Once such
discrimination exists, it can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, as rational consumers
expect to be discriminated against based on their race or sex everywhere, and rational
dealers maximize their own profits through discrimination.159 This effect, however,
might be smaller in a market limited to high-net-worth individuals; if a wealth tax
applied to billionaires only, as in the only application to individuals suggested
below,160 they might be expected to be able to defend their interests in market
transactions. The danger of such discrimination inheres in other insurance and
financial products, moreover, and the usual response is not to give up on the
possibility of the market altogether. Instead, the government seeks to craft laws that
prohibit discrimination in provision of such products. 161
If discrimination concerns were sufficiently weighty, a blunt corrective could be
applied. Specifically, the results of ex post audits and adjudications might be used to
correct any biases in pricing. That is, the law could guarantee that the ratio of ex post
audit assessments to amounts paid in both tax and insurance costs should be the same
for each of two (or more) groups. The group with relatively high payments in
comparison to ex post audited values would be subsidized, and the other group would
be taxed. Once again, this is an unusual remedy, and arguments against it exist. Even
if the number of ex post adjudications is relatively large, one should expect some
random differences to exist between populations. Moreover, membership in a group
may correlate with many other variables, and these variables may explain why a
particular group appears to have paid more or less relative to ex post valuations. The
government, however, could control for known observables in making
discrimination adjustments. My purpose is not necessarily to advocate such an
approach but to suggest that discrimination concerns need not be viewed as fatal to
mandatory tax penalty insurance. The requirement hat tax filings be registered with
the government can allow for remediations that would be difficult to implement in
other market contexts.
3. Information Collection
The government can also boost general market competitiveness and reduce
discrimination by improving consumer information.1 62 Consumers often have trouble
158. E.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining
for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995).
159. See id. at 317 (assessing "plausibility of revenue-based statistical discrimination").
160. See infra Section III.B.
161. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 38-42 (2005) (discussing antidiscrimination
laws for home mortgage lending).
162. Governments have sought to improve consumer information in a variety of ways-
for example, by conducting product testing. See GUNNAR TRUMBULL, CONSUMER CAPITALISM:
POLITICS, PRODUCT MARKETS, AND FIRM STRATEGY IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 103-07 (2006).
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buying financial products because it is difficult for individuals to read financial
contracts6 3 and assess alternative insurance policies.164 In turn, this leads financial
services companies to invest in marketing.165 Yet, for many types of insurance, it
would be difficult for the government to produce actionable information for
consumers. For example, the government could require auto insurers to report the
number of dollars the insurer paid per accident claim, but consumers of one auto
insurance company might be different from consumers of another-for example, in
the types of cars they drive or in their risk profile. Some information might be better
than no information, but it is difficult to envision how the government could
effectively develop a single number that provides auto insurance consumers the
information that they need to know. The challenge is even greater for insurance for
highly correlated losses, such as hurricanes. Any forecast of how an insurance
company will deal with an extreme challenge involves guesswork or, at least,
extrapolation.
With tax penalty insurance, all risk of civil penalties or refunds is transferred to
the insurer, so the taxpayer need not speculate how insurers will pay claims. The
government could thus require reporting of a single number embodying the
information that a taxpayer most needs to know: the average underpayment or
overpayment found in cases that are randomly selected. This information allows the
taxpayer to determine how much the taxpayer is paying the insurer as opposed to the
government and thus allows the taxpayer to shop more easily for the best insurer,
without the need to consult each one. The government might also publish other
statistics, such as the ratio of the assessments to the total amount that the taxpayer
paid, both to the government and the insurer.166 A ratio of 0.95, for example, would
indicate that customers' effective payment to the insurers was around 5%. A thornier
problem is providing information to consumers in the first year of a tax penalty
insurance program or alerting consumers when the insurer's behavior changes.
Market mechanisms, however, can provide solutions to this as well. For example, the
government can create a prediction market167 whose participants forecast, for each
163. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell, Howell E. Jackson, Brigette C. Madrian & Peter Tufano,
Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 98 (2011) (noting that government
standardization of interest rate disclosures helps consumers understand some mortgage terms
but not others).
164. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-
Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 375, 404 (1973) (noting that
consumers have difficulty obtaining information on insurers and insurance policies). For an
empirical study, see Harris Schlesinger & J.-Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg, Consumer
Information and Decisions to Switch Insurers, 60 J. RISK & INS. 591 (1993).
165. Studies suggest that such investments affect consumer purchase decisions. See, e.g.,
Stephen G. Fier & David M. Pooser, Advertising Effectiveness for Financial Services Firms:
Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry, 39 J. INS. ISSUES 137 (2016).
166. This information may be less useful in a context in which the insured tax filing does
not directly represent he tax paid but instead is an input into a broader formula. See supra text
accompanying notes 82-83.
167. See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING (2007) (describing how governments can create
prediction markets to aggregate private forecasts); Note, Prediction Markets and Law: A
Skeptical Account, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1217, 1236 (2009) (suggesting that prediction markets
will be most effective when, as would be the case here, the forecast is of aggregated
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insurer, the average underpayment or overpayment that an insurer will pay in
randomly selected cases at the end of a year. This approach also may provide more
useful information if the number of randomly selected cases per insurer is sufficiently
small that the actual results are noisy.
Regulation to encourage shopping among insurance plans is another technique for
ensuring that each taxpayer receives the best available price. For example, the
government might require insurers to leave offers to taxpayers open for a certain
period of time so that the taxpayers can shop the insurers' offers to competitors.168
More aggressively, the government might make such shopping automatic. After an
insurer enters into an offer with a taxpayer, any other insurer would be able to offer
the taxpayer a better deal. To protect privacy, bidders would receive minimal
information about the taxpayer, including, at least, the total tax liability assessed, the
cost of insurance, and the identity of the insurer, and might be able to request
additional information. Thus, if one insurer is known for stingy offers, other insurers
would have reason to undercut that insurer-for example, by offering some fixed
discount off that insurer's offers. In such a scheme, the second insurer may be
piggybacking in part on the original insurer's hard work assessing documents,169 so
regulation could provide that the insurer offering a better deal would need to make
some payment to the original insurer, such as a percentage of the fee. Thus,
consumers might still benefit by shopping wisely, but no company would be able to
exploit taxpayers systematically. Such a scheme would be more difficult in other
financial services products, such as mortgages, where there is more to the comparison
than price, including in this case, the total tax to be paid.
III. APPLICATIONS
The discussion so far has been of mandatory tax penalty insurance in the abstract.
Because no such regime exists, we cannot confirm empirically that the market would
work as expected, let alone measure market accuracy or cost effectiveness. Even if
such a market existed, usefulness might depend on the particular application. The
most ambitious possible applications likely would have greater costs than benefits,
and any initial experimentation would need to be on a much less ambitious scale.
Section III.A thus offers an application to an esoteric but important area of tax law:
transfer pricing. This area of law affects only sophisticated corporate taxpayers.
Moreover, it is possible that an early experiment could be opt in, with a mandatory
implementation only if that experiment is successful.
information that is clearly defined).
168. Many statutes guarantee consumers the right to rescind contracts within a certain
amount of time, such as three days. See Jeff Sovem, Written Notice of Cooling-OffPeriods: A
Forty-Year Natural Experiment in Illusory Consumer Protection and the Relative
Effectiveness of Oral and Written Disclosures, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 333, 334 & nn.1-5 (2014)
(enumerating such protections).
169. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
17-19 (2008) (explaining how sellers may free-ride off information provided by other sellers).
170. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1085 (2009) (explaining that "borrowers stopped relying
on the APR as the main tool for comparison shopping among loan products" because, among
other problems, the APR is an imperfect measure of the cost of credit).
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Section III.B then turns to a broader version of the art tax hypothetical: a wealth
tax. This would be considerably more ambitious, but the tax could still apply to just
a small percentage of very wealthy taxpayers. A wealth tax hypothetical is useful in
part because some types of wealth are easy to measure while some are very difficult
to value, and mandatory tax penalty insurance must work with both types.
Finally, Section III.C explores the possibility of anti-obesity sin taxes. A
government implementing sin taxes must measure the magnitude of sin, such as how
much different foods contribute to ill health. An alternative to detailed regulations
would be a standard applied to covered companies, such as restaurants and food
manufacturers. The government might specify the total amount of revenue to be
collected in advance and then use the mechanism to distribute the tax among the
insurers of randomly selected companies. As new studies change views about relative
food healthfulness, insurers' pricing would likely change as well, without need for
administrative hearings or fears that special interests will capture the agency
decision-making process. The feasibility of this application would depend on the
ability of insurers to individualize pricing based on a relatively small amount of
information, such as restaurant menus or ingredient lists.
A. Transfer Pricing
Transfer pricing rules define the accounting for transactions of closely related
companies,171 and the rules' goal is to reconstruct the prices that would have been
paid had those transactions been at arm's length.172 A multinational company would
like to locate profits in a relatively low-tax jurisdiction, and so it is in the company's
interest to ensure that subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions pay little for assets
purchased from subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions. Surveys of tax experts at
multinational enterprises indicate that transfer pricing has been the most important
area of tax controversy in recent years.173 A common fact pattern involves sales of
rights to intangible property.7 4 For example, inMedronic, Inc. v. Commissioner,175
the U.S. Tax Court assessed a transaction involving a corporate subsidiary located in
171. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (authorizing government to "distribute, apportion, or allocate
gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if [it] determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses").
172. See, e.g., Regulation 86 Relating to the Income Tax Under the Revenue Act of 1934,
art. 45-1(b) (1935) ("The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled
taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.").
173. ERNST & YOUNG, 2016 TRANSFER PRICING SURVEY SERIES: IN THE SPOTLIGHT: A NEW
ERA OF TRANSPARENCY AND RISK 7 (2016) (reporting that 72% of survey respondents
considered transfer pricing of goods and services to be among the most important controversy
areas, 39% identifying transfer pricing in the financial sphere, and 32% finding controversy in
transfer pricing of intangible property, with only 28% giving the most popular non-transfer
pricing answer, indirect taxes like the value added tax).
174. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 ("In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property
... the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income
attributable to the intangible.").
175. 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1515 (2016), vacated, 900 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2018).
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Puerto Rico, which enjoys certain tax benefits under U.S. law.17 6 If Medtronic can
arrange for the Puerto Rican subsidiary to pay a low price for technology, then more
of its income will be taxed in Puerto Rico than in other jurisdictions. Nonpatent
intangible property can also be involved. As Andrew Blair-Stanek notes, "the
copyright on the script for an unfilmed movie or unreleased software program, or the
trademark for a burgeoning product line, might be transferred for an artificially low
price."7 7 A multinational company can also make it more difficult to determine the
value of the intellectual property by bundling license and other transactions.178
In the United States, the applicable regulations recognize the uncertainty common
in transfer pricing calculations, noting that sometimes "application of a method may
produce a number of results from which a range of reliable results may be
derived."17 9 A taxpayer "will not be subject to adjustment" if the method it applies
falls anywhere within this range.180 Unsurprisingly, taxpayers aggressively take
advantage of this flexibility. "[W]ell-advised taxpayers," according to scholarly
experts on transfer pricing, "naturally will adopt a price that is at whichever extreme
end of the arm's-length range that yields the most favorable after-tax result."181
Moreover, there may be ambiguity not only in the result of a particular method but
in which method applies. Taxpayers are required to use "the method that, under the
facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length
result."18 2 The regulations provide some guidance183 but acknowledge that ultimately
"there is no strict priority of methods, and no method will invariably be considered
to be more reliable than others."184 Taxpayers are subject to significant procedural
rules, such as requirements of providing contemporaneous documentation,185 but that
still leaves potential for abuse. Taxpayers hire appraisers to determine the correct
prices, but these appraisers have the same incentives as appraisers of art for tax
purposes: to provide taxpayer-favorable valuations. 186
176. The historic tax exemption for Puerto Rico, eventually phased out, was I.R.C. § 936,
but a Medtronic subsidiary was earlier organized pursuant to that section. See id. at *23.
177. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 62
UCLA L. REv. 2, 14 (2015).
178. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 1iITH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING 54-60 (Comm.
Print 2010) (illustrating a complex hypothetical transaction).
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e)(1) (2019).
180. Id.
181. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About
Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Framework, 93 N.C. L. REv.
673, 685 (2015).
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (2019).
183. See id. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(i) (noting that the applicability of a method that compares
prices paid in arm's-length transactions "depends on the degree of comparability between the
controlled transaction or taxpayers and the uncontrolled comparables").
184. Id. § 1.482-1(c)(1).
185. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B) (noting that penalties may apply absent such
documentation). Recent guidance has emphasized that penalties may apply even with adequate
documentation. See, e.g., IRS Limits Use of Mandatory Transfer Pricing IDR and Instructs
Examiners on Penalties in Transfer Pricing Cases, 128 J. TAX'N 40, 40 (2018).
186. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 177, at 11; Lee A. Sheppard, Reflections on the
Death of Transfer Pricing, 120 TAx NOTES 1112 (2008).
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In short, at a high level of generality, the regulations express a standard rather
than a rule,187 and it is this feature that makes it an especially appealing potential
application of mandatory tax penalty insurance. To the extent that law is in fact
implemented as a standard, greater litigation may result because the outcome of any
particular case will be unpredictable.188 Unsurprisingly though, in the existing
system, transfer pricing law often takes on a rule-like quality. Case law gives content
to the standard in clarifying what methodologies are appropriate and in what
circumstances, and, over the years, tax authorities have increased their focus on
transfer pricing enforcement,189 with many countries now following OECD
recommendations.190 Transfer pricing has evolved from an ex post analysis of
transactions to an approach that focuses on taxpayers' contemporaneous self-
assessment of transactions, 191 in large part in response to concerns that the absence
of such documentation complicates audits.19 2 Taxpayers who invest in careful
documentation of their accounting choices can achieve reasonable certainty that their
decisions will be respected in audits.
The existing regime makes sense given the desire to provide taxpayers some
degree of certainty about the tax implications of transactions, and some reform
proposals accordingly suggest that further legal simplification should come in the
form of more taxpayer safe harbors.193 But the current approach has serious
downsides. The cost of producing contemporaneous documentation is high, with
expertise from the major accounting firms required.194 Businesses also may transfer
intangible assets to low-tax jurisdictions early in the product life cycle when it will
be easier to justify friendly tax valuations.195 Smaller international businesses may
187. Under the current tax system, there may be strong reasons for transfer pricing law to
rely primarily on standards. See William Skinner, The Future offLR.C. § 482 as a Substance-
Over-Form Provision, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 174 (2005) (identifying costs as well as
benefits of allowing IRS to recast transfer pricing transactions involving intangible property).
188. See Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 84, 85-86 (1994) (explaining how legal complexity increases the risk of
settlement failure).
189. See, e.g., Irina Diakonova, E&Y Survey: Transfer Pricing Risks on the Rise in
Financial Services Industry, 17 J. INT'L TAX'N 62 (2006).
190. See Action 8-10 Transfer Pricing, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-
actions/action8-10/ [https://perma.cc/2ZW8-NDT3].
191. See, e.g., Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson, Clearing Away the Sand:
Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today, 57 TAx L.
REv. 37, 96-98 (2003). The rules evolved over a series of budget bills and implementing
regulations. Id. at 97 n.223. The documentation requirements are contained in Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii), (d)(3)(iii). The documents must "accurately and completely describe the
basic transfer pricing analysis conducted by the taxpayer." Id. § 1.662-6(d)(2)(iii)(B).
192. See Durst & Culbertson, supra note 191, at 76 ("Treasury expressed concern about
the extent to which the burden of verifying compliance with the arm's length standard
traditionally had rested upon the tax administration, and in effect suggested that more of that
burden should shift to taxpayers.") (citing TREASURY DEP'T, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY
PRICING UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CODE, reprinted as I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B.
458, 466-68).
193. See id. at 124-27, 132-34.
194. See Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation ofIntangibles for
Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAx REv. 79, 81 & n.3 (2008).
195. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Is Transfer Pricing Worth Salvaging?, TAx NOTES 470
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be less capable of following the rules and then end up receiving disproportionate
attention from audits.196 The accounting investments, moreover, defeat the
underlying purpose of having multinational businesses, namely to reduce the costs
of internal transactions.197 The standard economic justification for firms is that they
help save on the costs of market negotiation,198 but if a firm must reconstruct what
every transaction would have looked like had there been a market, that may be as or
more expensive. Most fundamentally, rules can be exploited much more easily than
standards, and indeed they are. Studies indicate that multinationals greatly reduce
their taxes through income shifting, with profits systematically being recognized
more frequently in lower tax jurisdictions.199
The existing rule-oriented approach may well make sense in our existing tax
auditing regime. If transfer pricing rules were administered purely as standards, the
government would likely be able to target only a few especially aggressive taxpayers,
and others would end up paying even less. But rules are unlikely ever to solve the
problem or to bring the assessed tax base n ar what economic theory would seem to
justify. No matter how effectively doctrine and institutions develop, taxpayers will
likely still have ample room for engaging in tax avoidance through transfer pricing.
This can result in economic distortions (as transactions may be motivated by tax
considerations rather than economic substance) and a deadweight loss (as taxpayers
hire accountants and lawyers). Mandatory tax penalty insurance might be able to
reduce both of these costs. If multinationals expect tax authorities to have sufficient
discretion to see through transfer pricing schemes, transactions will be less tax
motivated. And if mandatory tax penalty insurance can help crack down on
loopholes, fewer resources would be devoted to tax avoidance.
With mandatory tax penalty insurance, government auditors and courts could look
at all available information to assess the substance of the transaction without
attaching any special weight to what accountants thought that they could justify at
the time. A taxpayer thus would not need to maintain a contemporaneous accounting,
though it would need to retain documents about the substance of the transaction. The
operation of mandatory tax penalty insurance in this context would be relatively
straightforward. Ideally, the relevant unit of randomization would be not a taxpayer,
(July 30, 2012), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/transfer-pricing/news-
analysis-transfer-pricing-worth-salvaging/2012/07/30/vkzx [https://perma.cc/8Y6Z-SRRU]
("The Veritas decision exemplifies the common practice of migrating the intangibles while
they are inchoate.") (citing Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 297 (2009)).
196. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a
Global Economy 15 (The Brookings Inst., The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2007-08,
2007), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links /Reforming
_Corporate_Taxation_in_a_Global Economy-_A Proposal toAdopt Formulary
_Apportionment.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW4V-PT9Z] ("[S]mall and medium-sized
enterprises, which cannot afford the major accounting firms, are left to fend for themselves
and are frequently targeted for audits in which the IRS can use more sophisticated methods
than the taxpayer's methods .... ").
197. See id. at 8 ("[W]ith firms that are truly integrated across borders, holding related
entities to an arm's length standard for the pricing of intracompany transactions does not make
sense, nor does allocating income and expenses on a country-by-country basis.").
198. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-91 (1937).
199. Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 196, at 9.
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but an individual transaction, such as the sale of intangibles between related
companies. The corporate taxpayer in the jurisdiction requiring insurance would
register the transaction. Because a great deal of money can be at stake with such
transactions, the appropriate multiplier might be relatively low, perhaps 100, to
ensure that insurers can offer coverage for even some of the highest-dollar
transactions, though higher multipliers might be appropriate for smaller dollar
transactions. If a transaction were randomly selected, the government would deploy
an auditing team to price the transaction, without deferring to a taxpayer's
contemporaneous accounting.
The principal argument against mandatory tax penalty insurance in the transfer
pricing context would likely focus on the insurers' cost in assessing individual
companies' risks. Yet, these new costs will be balanced by a reduction in taxpayers'
own costs. While a company would still employ professionals such as lawyers and
accountants, the increased focus on standards rather than rules would decrease their
work. If taxpayers expect to pay taxes based on economic substance, then there is
less need to pay lawyers and accountants to disguise substance with form. The
insurers would hire their own lawyers, accountants, and economists, but these
professionals will focus on economic substance as well. Rather than requiring skill
in constructing and documenting transactions, these professionals would principally
require judgment, manifested in an ability to assess how government decision makers
think. Just as a lawyer can develop an opinion about how strong a case is before fully
litigating it, so too should it be less expensive for an insurer to decide what value to
certify than it would be for an insurer to develop a full-fledged economic model
identifying every comparable transaction. Although it is an empirical question, it thus
seems likely that the ex ante decision-making regime should require fewer resources.
Random selection, meanwhile, should greatly reduce the cost of decision-making ex
post.
The principal argument for mandatory tax penalty insurance, however, does not
depend on the exact balance of relative costs. Rather, the argument is that transfer
pricing appears to be broken. Transactions are structured for tax purposes, and such
structuring is successful to a great extent. Perhaps conventional substantive solutions
could ameliorate the solution, but the core challenge is that transactions are so
heterogeneous that comparables are often difficult to identify, and rules that capture
the arm's-length concept are difficult to craft. This Article's suggestion is to abandon
the quest. The premise is that the government should not need to craft detailed
transfer pricing rules, substantive and procedural, so long as government auditors
could be expected to get things about right on average. Ex post analysis would
involve economic experts, as it now does, so the simplification of the law should
increase consideration of subtle arguments. Standards may lead to errors in particular
cases, but insurers can bear the risk of that. With a standards-based approach, there
would be no need to defer to the taxpayer. Deference no longer helps much in
reducing litigation, and eliminating deference closes loopholes.
The insurance regime can thus be seen as a procedural reform (mandatory
insurance and random selection) that changes the optimal substantive law so that it
focuses more on economic substance and less on form. The analysis here, of course,
is far short of the work needed to justify a change of regime. Ideally, the ex post
decision makers would receive at least some guidance about how to choose among
applicable economic models so that insurers and taxpayers would be able to make
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reasonably accurate forecasts. Moreover, this Article has simply assumed that the
arm's-length transaction approach would be the appropriate standard. But one could
argue that if the regime were to switch to a standard, then another standard might be
preferable, such as worldwide formula apportionment.200 A similar approach has
long been used to apportion business income across states, with the full income of
the business allocated based on factors such as where the business owns property,
where employees work, and where sales occur.201 A strike against the approach is its
unpredictability,202 but mandatory tax penalty insurance mitigates this concern. A
principal argument against worldwide formula apportionment, however, is that it
would be unworkable within the international system,203 and a full analysis of any
change to the transfer pricing system must consider international implications.
If further analysis suggested the viability of mandatory tax penalty insurance for
transfer pricing, the government would not need to switch abruptly. A much more
modest approach would be to allow taxpayers to opt into tax penalty insurance. The
carrot would be that the taxpayers would not need to follow existing rules governing
contemporaneous documentation. This might not be enough of a carrot because
multinationals are so effective at reducing their tax burdens under existing transfer
pricing doctrine. But the government could offer additional carrots as well, such as
some discount on the total tax bill. If that proved successful, the government might
eventually shift o applying a stick to firms declining to opt in, such as more skeptical
review of taxpayer accounting, and that in turn would allow it to decrease the carrots.
The substantive law also would not need to change all at once, but instead could
become more standard-like over time. Mandatory tax penalty insurance is not an all-
or-nothing proposition, and only experimentation with more modest versions of it
can establish whether it is viable more generally.
B. Wealth Tax
The increase in inequality within countries across the world has sparked interest
in the possibility of wealth taxes. Thomas Piketty, in a recent best-selling book,204
documents inequality and suggests a global wealth tax.20 5 In the United States,
Senator Elizabeth Warren has endorsed a wealth tax, with an annual rate of 2% for
those with wealth over $50 million, plus an extra 4% for every dollar over $1
billion,206 and Senator Bernie Sanders endorsed a tax with a highest marginal annual
200. For an argument for switching to a version of worldwide formula apportionment, see
Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 196.
201. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983)
(approving use of three-factor formula).
202. Notably, Avi-Yonah and Clausing suggest considering only a single factor-sales.
Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 196, at 12 (calling this "far simpler"). They acknowledge,
however, that this approach "can produce arbitrary results in a given industry." Id. at 19.
203. See, e.g., William J. Wilkins & Kenneth W. Gideon, Memorandum to the U.S.
Congress: You Wouldn't Like Worldwide Formula Apportionment, 9 TAx NOTES 1915 (1994)
(arguing that it is impractical to tax activities of worldwide businesses with no U.S. production
nexus).
204. PIKETTY, supra note 33.
205. Id. at 515.
206. See Ultra-Millionaire Tax, supra note 33.
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rate of 8%.207 The idea of a wealth tax is not new. Many European countries have
had wealth taxes,208 though fewer do today, in part because such taxes led some
wealthy individuals to emigrate.209 Scholars have offered proposals of how a U.S.
wealth tax might work.210 A significant legal question in the United States is whether
a wealth tax would be a "direct tax" and thus subject to apportionment under the
Constitution,21 1 meaning that the total tax imposed in each state must be proportional
to the population of that state.?2 An 1895 Supreme Court case defines "direct tax"
sufficiently broadly to encompass a wealth tax,2 1 3 but advocates of wealth taxation214
point to an earlier Supreme Court case with a narrower definition,21 5 and they also
suggest hat the Sixteenth Amendment, which allowed income taxation,216 implicitly
narrowed the definition of "direct tax."217 These issues are all beyond this Article's
207. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Bernie Sanders Proposes a Wealth Tax: 'I Don't Think
That Billionaires Should Exist.', N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/bernie-sanders-wealth-tax.html
[https://perma.cc/6E6U-HBVP].
208. E.g., Moris Lehner, The European Experience with a Wealth Tax: A Comparative
Discussion, 53 TAxL. REv. 615 (2000).
209. Gabriel Zucman & Emmanuel Saez, Wealth Taxes Often Failed in Europe. They




210. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 94-112
(1999); David J. Shakow, A Wealth Tax: Taxing the Estates of the Living, 57 B.C. L. REv. 947
(2016); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAx L. REv. 499
(2000) (arguing for a flat wealth tax, with wages also taxed as a means of taxing human capital
wealth); Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1421 (2018) (arguing for a
combined tax on income and wealth, with wealth measured as an annuity value).
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("[D]irect Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States .... ").
212. Relative to a wealth tax that provides for the same formula in each state, with
apportionment, taxpayers subject to the tax would pay more in states with a lower wealth tax
base per capita. One way around this would be to tax all taxpayers according to the same
formula but then reimburse enough money to relatively wealthy states so that the net amount
meets the requirements of apportionment. See John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest
Proposalfor a Constitutionally Apportioned Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 514-
15 (2014). This would ensure horizontal equity across taxpayers, but not across states.
213. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), reh'g granted, 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
214. See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National
Wealth Tax, 93 IND. L.J. 111 (2018).
215. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796) (upholding annual tax on
carriages).
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.").
217. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 33-
39 (1999). Ackerman notes that in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), the Supreme Court
had narrowed Pollock, and contends that the Sixteenth Amendment explicitly allowed only
"income taxes" because of a post-Knowlton understanding that wealth taxes would be
permissible. Ackerman, supra, at 33.
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scope, as are most arguments for and against wealth taxation in general.2 1
Mandatory tax penalty insurance, however, may help address one specific concern
with wealth taxation, specifically the claim that it is unworkable because of
difficulties invaluation. Defenders of Warren's and Sanders's proposals project large
revenue gains even given what they characterize as conservative assumptions about
tax avoidance,219 while critics are doubtful.220 Both sides, however, naturally assume
that any such tax would be collected in the traditional manner, with audits of some
percentage of covered taxpayers.2 2 1 At the heart of such audits might be appraisals
of all assets of the taxpayers, perhaps with some modest exclusions, such as food and
clothing for personal use. Leading scholars, however, have thought appraisals to be
an unworkable approach to annual valuation,2 2 2 noting, "Any system requiring
appraisals is likely to be a loss for the government because it does not have the
resources to win." 22 3 Thus, an alternative would be the development of detailed rules
for each type of asset.22 But it is likely impossible to craft rules that will not leave
significant loopholes, and well-advised ultramillionaires seem likely to exploit these
loopholes and grossly undervalue their assets. This may lead not only to horizontal
inequity (as some are more aggressive than others) but also to revenue reduction and
deadweight loss from payments to accountants and lawyers.
The underlying standard for what is being taxed with a wealth tax could be
conceptually similar to what is taxed in transfer pricing.22 5 The estate and gift taxes
value assets by assessing the value of a hypothetical transaction involving a willing
buyer and seller,2 2 6 much as transfer pricing is based on a hypothetical market
transaction. Valuing this hypothetical transaction involves many analytical
complications. A critique of the wealth tax entitled It'sAllAbout Valuation identifies
some of these challenges.2 27 For example, a taxpayer may "use co-ownership of an
asset and family limited partnerships or limited liability companies to reduce the
asset's value by claiming minority discounts for the property."228 Even if ownership
interests can be ascertained, businesses are difficult to value.229 Real estate is
218. See generally David Hasen, Accretion-Based Progressive Wealth Taxation, 20 FLA.
TAx REV. 277, 285-92 (2017) (summarizing arguments, focusing particularly on the claim
that wealth taxes unfairly penalize savers).
219. Letter from Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman to Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Jan. 18,
2019), https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/saez-zucman-wealthtax-warren.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JD93-F55V] (projecting $2.75 trillion in revenue over ten years, despite reductions in
"reported net worth by 15% through a combination of tax evasion and tax avoidance").
220. See Summers & Sarin, supra note 34.
221. See, e.g., Ultra-Millionaire Tax, supra note 33 (promising "a significant increase in
the IRS enforcement budget" and "a minimum audit rate," without specifying what the rate
would be).
222. See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization:
A "Revolutionary"Approach to Ownership, 47 TAxL. REV. 725, 743 (1992) ("We agree that
appraisals are a costly and burdensome solution .... ").
223. Id. at 743 n.78.
224. See, e.g., id. at 733-37 (proposing rules for allocating ownership).
225. See supra Section IIlA.
226. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).
227. James R. Repetti, It's All About Valuation, 53 TAx L. REV. 607 (2000).
228. Id. at 609.
229. Id. at 611-12 (noting difficulties with "[t]he selection of appropriate comparable
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routinely valued by localities, but some have argued that such valuation is highly
subjective.230 With these assets and others, the greater the degree of subjectivity, the
greater the incentive that taxpayers would have to undervalue and litigate. The IRS
would need to be highly selective in choosing valuations to contest, so even an
aggressive, well-funded tax authority might have only modest success in curbing tax
avoidance that does not amount to tax evasion. The costs of all such disputes,
meanwhile, are a deadweight loss.
Especially if a wealth tax is limited to the relatively small number of
ultramillionaire taxpayers, the government's task in administering the tax may well
be manageable. The comparison between mandatory tax penalty insurance then
involves empirical questions about how much taxpayers would underpay in the
existing system, how great the economic distortions would be from tax avoidance,
and the relative cost of private insurance provision and government auditing. On one
hand, the lack of experience with mandatory tax penalty insurance argues strongly
against implementing it with so significant a policy initiative. On the other hand, the
incentives that the insurance regime provides suggests that one can be far more
confident that taxpayer evasion will be limited, and this may be particularly
important given the disagreement about the efficacy of a conventionally administered
wealth tax. This Article's purpose is to add an enforcement regime not previously
considered to the regulatory menu, not to insist that mandatory tax penalty insurance
would necessarily be the best policy option.
The insurance regime is not the only alternative to conventional administration of
a wealth tax. The literature has considered another, still more radical approach: self-
assessment.2 31 A taxpayer would publicly value each asset, and these valuations
would entitle others to purchase the asset at hat price. Eric Posner and Glen Weyl
have suggested performing all taxation with this approach, with a tax in the range of
5-10% annually for most asset types,23 2 and they argue that, aside from generating
revenue, such a tax would have the salutary effect of discouraging owners of property
from holding out for prices far above their own valuations.23 3 Popular discomfort
with converting all property rules into liability rules likely limits the political appeal
of self-assessment. But self-assessment could be used as an optional adjunct to a
mandatory insurance regime. If a taxpayer is willing to subject itself to the self-
assessment regime, that provides strong evidence of value. An insurer would thus
not need to do nearly as much work on its own to verify the valuation of that asset,
and the costs of mandatory insurance should be reduced. This highlights the broader
point that if there are assets for which valuation is easy or if there are techniques that
businesses, the estimate of future earnings, the selection of appropriate discount rates to
calculate the present value of future earnings, and the estimate of liquidation values").
230. Id. at 611 & n.21 (quoting Cherokee W. Wooley, Comment, Regulation ofReal Estate
Appraisers and Appraisals: The Effects ofFIRREA, 43 EMORY L.J. 357, 391 (1994)).
231. See, e.g., Arnold C. Harberger, Issues of Tax Reform for Latin America, in FISCAL
POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 110, 116-121 (Joint Tax Program of the
Organization of American States ed., 1965); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems
for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REv. 771, 773-90 (1982).
232. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 51, 85 (2017).
233. Id. at 63.
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a taxpayer can use to facilitate valuation, the mandatory insurance regime can
encourage their use.
C. Anti-Obesity Taxes
The previous two Sections have illustrated that mandatory tax penalty insurance
not only provides a procedure that ensures tax enforcement, but also can change tax
law substance, allowing more standard-like tax provisions that leave refinement to
ex post decision-making. This Section offers a third example: sin taxes-with a
particular focus on taxes of unhealthy foods. Taxes are one of many strategies that
might be used to combat the increase in obesity.234 They might be justified on the
ground that consumption of some foods imposes external costs (such as
environmental damage from food production235) and internal costs (health
consequences to the consumer236). A consumer may ignore external costs and may
not fully internalize the internal costs-for example, because the "multiple selves"
problem means that the consumer undervalues harm to the consumer's future self.237
For present purposes, we assume that food taxes are justifiable if there is a means of
administering them effectively.
Any mechanism for taxing foods must resolve the question of what constitutes the
tax base-that is, what foods will be taxed and how much. The government could
target particular unhealthy foods and drinks-for example, by imposing a tax of a
specified amount on sodas with more than a specified amount of sugar.238 An
alternative is to impose taxes that rise with the amount of sugar in the product.239
This approach gives manufacturers incentives to reduce sugar as much as possible,
rather than only below some arbitrary threshold. If the tax is set at the cost imposed
per unit of sugar, then manufacturers will reduce sugar contents until the marginal
benefits of sugar in increasing consumer satisfaction, and thus revenue, equal the
marginal costs. But sugar is not the only possible food tax target. Other sweeteners
may, calorie for calorie, contribute to obesity just as much.24
234. See generally David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of
Paternalism, 46 CONN. L. REv. 1687 (2014) (providing a review of strategies along a
continuum of paternalism).
235. See Roberta F. Mann, Controlling the Environmental Costs of Obesity, 47 ENV'T L.
REv. 695, 703-06 (2017).
236. For an argument that government regulation may help individuals take into account
internalities that they otherwise might ignore as a result of time-inconsistent preferences, see
Saul Levmore, Internality Regulation Through Public Choice, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
447 (2014).
237. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1205-09 (1998)
(discussing the multiple selves problem).
238. See, e.g., Susan M. Kansagra, Maura O. Kennelly, Cathy A. Nonas, Christine J.
Curtis, Gretchen Van Wye, Andrew Goodman & Thomas A. Farley, Reducing Sugary Drink
Consumption: New York City's Approach, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 61 (2015) (reporting
proposal of 18% sales tax and one cent per ounce excise tax).
239. See NORTON FRANCIS, DONALD MARRON & KIM RUEBEN, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE
PROS AND CONS OF TAXING SWEETENED BEVERAGES BASED ON SUGAR CONTENT (2016)
(advocating this approach while also acknowledging caveats).
240. See, e.g., George A. Bray, Samara Joy Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin, Consumption of
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A calorie tax, meanwhile, may be imperfect if, as some claim, not all calories are
equal in contributing to obesity.24 1 An alternative approach might target fats or
specific types of fats, such as trans fats.24 2 Many nutritional experts, meanwhile,
blame "processed foods" for the obesity epidemic.24 3 Yet not all processed foods are
the same.24 4 Therefore, an ideal tax might distinguish on the basis of particular
ingredients; for example, a higher taxes could be levied on some preservatives than
on others. Even if we could measure obesity contributions ingredient by ingredient,
that might not be all that matters. Perhaps a forty-ounce Super Big Gulp should
receive more than double the tax of a twenty-ounce Gulp, if it is desirable to counter
consumers' tendency to choose large sizes that appear to offer the best value.245
Perhaps some packaging designs should be taxed more than others, if they nudge
consumers to unhealthy eating habits.24 6 Everyone needs some calories in each meal,
so perhaps restaurant taxes should kick in only when the calories per person is too
high. In short, many variables might be relevant in determining the appropriate tax
on each food or drink.
Unsurprisingly, the taxes that have been implemented make no serious effort to
factor in these variables. Hungary's 2011 law targeted various ingredients besides
sugar, but on a flat basis when products exceeded certain thresholds.24 7 Mexico had
a similar approach.248 Denmark varied its tax based on the amount of the targeted
illicit ingredient, but this ingredient was fat, and sugar had a free pass.249 Berkeley
taxed drinks with added sugar, but the tax was based on the size of drinks rather than
the amount of sugar, and consumers could buy untaxed sweeteners to add to their
drinks.250 New York City simply banned large drinks rather than charge a tax.251 Part
of the explanation for these simplistic, incomplete approaches may be that fat taxes
High-Fructose Corn Syrup in Beverages May Play a Role in the Epidemic of Obesity, 79 AM.
J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 537 (2004).
241. See, e.g., Gary Taubes, The Science ofObesity: WhatDo We Really Know About What
Makes Us Fat?, 346 BRIT. MED. J. 16 (2013).
242. See, e.g., Gabriel Edelman, The New York City Trans Fat Ban: A Healthy Law, 17
J.L. & POL'Y 271 (2008).
243. See, e.g., Maria Laura de Costa Louzada et al., Consumption of Ultra-Processed
Foods and Obesity in Brazilian Adolescents and Adults, 81 PREVENTATIVE MED. 9 (2015).
244. See, e.g., Not All Processed Foods Are Unhealthy, HARv. MEN'S HEALTH WATCH
(June 2015), https://www.health.harvard.edu/staying-healthy/not-all-processed-foods-are-
unhealthy [https://perma.cc/XM49-NQMQ].
245. See, e.g., WM Vermeer, IHM Steenhuis & MP Poelman, Small, Medium, Large or
Supersize? The Development and Evaluation of Interventions Targeted at Portion Size, 38
INT'L J. OBESITY S13 (2014).
246. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Adapting the Universal Signals of
Traffic Lights to Food Packaging, NUDGE (Dec. 4, 2008), http://nudges.org/adapting-the-
universal-signals-of-traffic-lights-to-food-packaging/ [https://perma.cc/42N5-Q26K].
247. DONALD MARRON, MAEVE GEARING & JOHN ISELIN, TAX POL'Y CTR., SHOULD WE
TAX UNHEALTHY FOODS AND DRINKS? 8 (2015).
248. Jeffrey Grogger, Soda Taxes and the Prices of Sodas and Other Drinks: Evidence
from Mexico 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21197, 2015).
249. MARRON ET AL., supra note 247, at 8.
250. Id. at 9.
251. A court struck down the ban as beyond the enacting agency's authority. See N.Y.
Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of Corn. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene,
16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014).
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do not enjoy much popular support.252 But the public's opposition probably does not
depend on the mechanics of implementation, and narrow taxes are open to the
objection that they unfairly target certain products.25 3 Despairing of the possibility of
a tax that applies to all unhealthy foods, and recognizing that taxing only some
unhealthy foods leads to substitution to other health foods, one commentator suggests
giving up on distinguishing healthfulness altogether, instead applying a uniform sales
tax on all food, taxing Twinkies and broccoli equally. 54
The fundamental obstacle is that the regulatory technology to tailor taxes to
particular products in a meaningful way is cumbersome. A regulatory agency could,
in principle, draft detailed rules. These rules would need to identify all problematic
ingredients and assign per unit tax levels to them. If information changes over time
about the relative healthfulness of different foods, an agency would need to update
the rules. Special interests inevitably would lobby, arguing that their products are a
healthy part of a balanced diet, and preferred constituencies such as agricultural
interests in key legislators' jurisdictions might be able to tilt the process in their own
favor. Once the regulations are enacted, the government would need to create a
significant enforcement apparatus, particularly if regulations apply not only to
multinational corporations like PepsiCo and Kraft-Heinz but also to mom-and-pop
restaurants.
Mandatory tax penalty insurance could be based on a simple standard, perhaps
setting taxes at a level sufficiently high enough to "lead[] consumers and businesses
to make more efficient eating and drinking choices."2 5 5 The regulation would need
to define covered entities, such as processed food producers and restaurants. It would
need to establish an agency that would: (1) accept tax payments from insurance
companies, (2) conduct randomized audits, and (3) hear appeals of those audits. The
agency's rules would also need to specify penalties for failing to obtain required
insurance, possibly providing whistleblowers incentives for reporting such
failures. 256 These are not trivial tasks, but the principal challenge of assessing
individual food providers can be conducted ex post. If food providers separately
register each product or menu item, then for each random selection, the inquiry can
be quite focused.
This approach would make it far more difficult for special interests to distort the
process. In principle, the agency might enact specific rules making particular foods
exempt if granted such authority by the legislature, or the legislature itself might
embed exceptions into the statute. But this would be far more obvious to the public
than in a regime in which complex regulations govern each food, among which it
would be easy to sprinkle provisions favoring particular interests. One might worry
252. See, e.g., Colleen L. Barry, Jeff Niederdeppe & Sarah E. Gollust, Taxes on Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages: Results from a 2011 National Public Opinion Survey, 44 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 158 (2013) (substantiating lack of support for sugary beverage taxes).
253. See, e.g., id. at 158 ("The most popular anti-tax argument was that a tax on sugar-
sweetened beverages is arbitrary because it does not affect consumption of other unhealthy
foods (60%).").
254. See Zarko Kalamov, A Sales Tax Is Better at Promoting Healthy Diets Than the Fat
Tax and the Thin Subsidy, 29 WILEY HEALTH ECON. 353 (2020).
255. MARRON, GEARING & ISELIN, supra note 248, at 18.
256. See generally Yehonatan Givati, A Theory of Thistleblower Rewards, 45 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43 (2016) (providing a law and economics analysis of whistleblower programs).
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that special interests would seek to affect the process after random selection.
Adjudicative processes, however, may be more difficult to influence improperly than
legislative processes. Assuming the auditors and judicial decision makers must
produce written explanations of their decisions and must avoid improper ex parte
communications, decisions are likely to depend on auditors' and adjudicators' views
of the latest evidence on underlying health issues. The decision makers could take a
wide range of considerations into account in making these assessments, and
insurance companies, which can bear the risk of an occasional eccentric opinion,
would price the insurance based on their expectations of these decisions. Decision
makers can even consider subtle issues such as whether restaurant axes should be
deducted for taxes paid for ingredients257 and whether some contributions to bad
health are so modest that they should be treated as de minimis and pay no tax.2 8
With decision-making ex post, insurers face two sources of uncertainty: first,
about the relative contribution of food providers; and second, about the overall level
of taxation that he tax would impose. For example, an insurer might conclude, taking
into account factors including their menus and the amount of business that they do,
that a particular McDonald's franchise should expect to pay on average 20% more
than a particular White Castle, but the insurer might still be quite unsure about the
overall level of taxation. This may depend on political considerations, such as
whether the political party that will control the administrative agency at the relevant
time is generally sympathetic or hostile to taxes on food generally. To prevent the
cost of insurance from rising and falling rapidly with the political winds, the
government can provide that the tax will be collected well into the future, say eight
years, so that prices represent an average of what different administrations might be
expected to do. But the political risk will still be systematic because it affects all
payers of the food tax and thus costs insurers more to bear.25 9 That increasing cost to
insurers, in turn, will raise the costs to food providers.
It is possible, however, to eliminate this systematic risk by having the legislature
set a fixed fund for the total amount of revenue that the tax should raise in a particular
tax year.260 For example, the legislature might decide that the total tax to be assessed
will be $1 billion. Instead of specifying a precise multiplier, the legislature might
provide that the agency will review some number of different randomly selected tax
filings. Then, the agency would apportion the $1 billion among them. For example,
after randomly selecting tax filings A and B, the agency might conclude that the food
product or menu item corresponding to tax filing A contributed 100 times more to
obesity than the one corresponding to tax filing B, and in this case theA insurer would
257. See Adriana Badilas, Comment, Food Taxes: A Palatable Solution to the Obesity
Epidemic?, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. Bus. & DEV. L.J. 255, 274-77 (2011) (arguing that
food taxes should be value-added taxes).
258. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1651, 1669-
71 (2001) (noting D.C. Circuit cases encouraging de minimis exemptions).
259. See supra Section II.A.
260. This approach would convert mandatory tax penalty insurance from an "unbounded"
institution to a "bounded" one. See Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE L.J. 336
(2014). Concern that decision makers might be biased would advance the case for a bounded
institution. Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted) ("The bound is most attractive to the principal when
the agent's bias is high, the variability of quality within the population is low, and the agent
faces a large sample of subjects.").
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be charged 100 times more for A than the B insurer would be charged for B. An
advantage of the fixed fund approach is that it allows for a relatively easy transition,
as it will be easy for the legislature to scale up the total amount collected if the
program is successful. Meanwhile, if the goal of the program is solely to affect
behavior rather than to collect revenue, the government might well redistribute the
$1 billion among the affected taxpayers-for example in proportion to total sales.
The program would then effectively subsidize relatively healthy food producers
while penalizing relatively unhealthy ones.
CONCLUSION
Mandatory tax penalty insurance is yet unknown in tax practice, but insurance
mandates are common. In every state, for example, drivers must purchase automobile
insurance for injuries that they might cause.26 1 Such requirements in principle can
provide a market check on who may drive, removing the most dangerous drivers
from the streets.2 62 In practice, loose enforcement of laws against driving without a
license2 63 and state subsidization of risky drivers2 64 undermines this function. But the
prospect of insurance rate increases provides a market-based incentive that deters
moving violations,2 6 5 independent of the political process that sets fines and
adjudicates cases. Drivers often decry insurers, but our tolerance of the system
reflects that the market-based system and political system are useful complements.
While traffic court offers due process, the market imposes its discipline under the
constraint of competition. Likewise, the case for mandatory tax penalty insurance
recognizes that the demands of due process allow only a very small number of cases
to be adjudicated formally, but competition among insurers may fill the gap.
Mandatory tax penalty insurance reflects wo simple ideas, one following from
the other. First, if insurance companies are required to assume the risk of paying tax
penalties, the stakes in ex post audits can be much higher because insurers are better
261. See Mila Araujo & Julius Mansa, Understanding Minimum Car Insurance
Requirements, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-minimum-car-
insurance-requirements-2645473 [https://perma.cc/U38F-93D4] (last updated July 29, 2020).
262. See Scott E. Harrington & Helen I. Doerpinghaus, The Economics of Automobile
Insurance Rate Classification, 60 J. RISK & INS. 59, 63-65 (1993). Insurers' consideration of
variables such as age and sex has been controversial. Regina Austin, The Insurance
Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 517 (1983).
263. See, e.g., Elaine H. Charney, Repeat Offender Driving Reform: Summary of Key
Elements and Practice Tips, 79 MICH. BAR J. 810, 810 (2000) (quoting governor stating that
"people driving with suspended or revoked licenses had reached 'epidemic proportions"').
264. See, e.g., New Jersey Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1982, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
17:29A-33 to 29A-52 (West 2020) (requiring insurers to participate in a "risk pool" for drivers
unable to obtain insurance otherwise); Ryan A. Earhart, Lifting the Iron Curtain ofAutomobile
Insurance Regulation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1193, 1196 (1998) (discussing risk pools); Judith K.
Mintel, The Effects of the Pricing of Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Sold Through
Residual Market Mechanisms on Competition and Market Structure, 1 J. INS. REGUL. 289
(1983).
265. The reduction of care attributable to insurance is known as moral hazard. E.g., Steven
Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979). But the knowledge
that insurance prices will increase if a driver receives a ticket, even when no injuries result,
may cause drivers to increase care.
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situated than individual taxpayers to bear the risk. Penalties and refunds can be set at
a level where an insurer will be willing to certify that the taxpayer has paid the correct
amount of tax only where the insurer believes that the tax payment plus its own fee
will be enough to pay the government what ex post auditors would charge on average,
while leaving the insurer some profit. Second, with insurers as a bulwark against
taxpayers taking aggressive positions, the nature of tax administration changes. Tax
provisions can and should rely much more on standards than on rules and much more
on economic substance than on form. Detailed rules can help ensure horizontal equity
among taxpayers, but the discipline of insurance market pricing provides a substitute.
Standards' usual vice, that they permit inconsistent treatment, is less of a concern,
while their virtue, that they prevent exploitation of loopholes, remains as strong as
ever.
The case for mandatory tax penalty insurance, however, is not an unambiguous
one. Much rides on how well the insurance market would work. Standard economics
suggests that most of the risk that insurers would bear is nonsystematic and thus can
be absorbed cheaply. Other techniques, such as government-provided insurance
matching and staged randomization, can further reduce risk. Taxpayers, however,
would indirectly pay for the services of insurers in performing what amounts to a
private auditing function and in adjudicating cases ex post. How much taxpayers
would pay over what the government receives depends on whether regulation can
ensure competitiveness and nondiscrimination in the insurance market. These
considerations suggest that it would make little sense for mandatory tax penalty
insurance to apply to all taxpayers' entire tax liability, at least in a country that has
been able to establish some semblance of a fair and efficient tax system.266 Especially
in early experiments, mandatory tax penalty insurance would need to apply to
narrowly defined taxes, particularly taxes paid by businesses or wealthy individuals
capable of navigating insurance markets.
266. In contrast, China has a tax collection apparatus that has been criticized for resulting
in substantial horizontal inequity. See Wei Cui, Administrative Decentralization and Tax
Compliance: A Transactional Cost Perspective, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 186, 198 (2015). Yet the
primary problem-that is, decentralized tax collectors have substantial discretion-suggests
that mandatory tax penalty insurance might lie on a feasible path to reform. Tax collectors
might be subject to something like the penalty-reward mechanism, and taxpayers might be
granted the right to choose among tax collectors.
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